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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON DIVERSIFICATION AND CORPORATE POLICIES 
 
by  
Catalina Ioana Hurwitz 
Florida International University, 2016  
Miami, Florida 
Professor Wen-Hsiu (Julia) Chou, Co-Major Professor 
 
 Professor Arun J. Prakash, Co-Major Professor 
 
In the first essay using a sample of 3437 U.S. companies over the period 1992-
2014, I demonstrate that international business activities of newly listed firms influence 
their corporate policies. Specifically, firms earning foreign pre-tax income at an early phase 
of their growth and development have higher investment and a higher propensity to 
acquire. I show that cash holdings are lower for firms involved in foreign activities, 
supportive of Duchin’s (2010) coinsurance theory. Further, CEOs of globally diversified 
firms have less pay-for-performance sensitivity than those of purely domestic firms. In 
order to avoid model misspecification and inefficient coefficient estimates I employ a two-
stage least squares (2SLS) as well as a dynamic panel GMM estimation. My results are 
robust when examining hot IPOs, IPOs that are diversified globally but not industrially, 
when using propensity score matching and other tests.  
The second essay examines the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2002) on 
excess valuation calculated with the chop shop approach, which is typically used to 
measure the diversification discount. The results indicate a significant drop in excess 
vii 
valuation after SOX for both pure-play and multi-segment companies. Additional 
investigation of the calculation methodology and a difference-in-differences model show 
no distinction in this impact between un-accelerated and accelerated companies. There is 
no evidence to support that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act leads firms to diversify or focus. I run 
several robustness tests by including 2003 observations, creating a 2000-2006 subsample, 
excluding geographic segments. I also look at companies in existence in 2002 and SOX 
has once again a negative effect regarding excess valuation. I conclude that corporate 
accountability guidelines or governance in action is beneficial for firms and shareholders. 
Finally, when in a firm's life would it fit for it to become involved in global 
strategies? What are the important influences on the decisions of young and mature firms 
to go international? I answer these questions in the third essay by examining the 
determinants that affect the choices of born-globals (BGs) and born-again globals (BaGs) 
to expand worldwide. My study is based on pre-existent theories of diversification, and I 
place specific emphasis on the conceivable role of peer influence and the motivation or 
desire for growth. I further study the entrenchment, the idiosyncratic risk, and the 
innovation caliber hypothesis. My results document that innovation efficiency strongly 
enhances BG’s propensity to global diversify. On the other hand, peer pressure, CEO 
ownership and idiosyncratic risk level significantly influence BGs not to globalize. In 
contrast, BaGs are positively influenced by their industry peers, showing how competition 
works in the financial markets for youthful versus mature companies.  
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1 
CHAPTER 1: THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON CORPORATE POLICIES OF 
NEWLY LISTED FIRMS 
1.1. Introduction 
Firms’ corporate policy decisions are examined tangentially when researchers 
study how firms’ value is influenced by diversification. Indeed, corporate decisions are 
included among regressors (see Thomas 2002, Villalonga 2004a, 2004b, Chen 2006, Chen 
and Chen 2011), or interaction terms between the diversification dummy and the firm’s 
financial corporate policy are added to the regression (see Mansi and Reeb 2002). 
Corporate policies are also used to eliminate selection bias issues (see Graham et al. 2002 
and Chkir and Cosset 2003, who examine samples of firms that diversify via acquisitions). 
In this paper I assert that is not sufficient to regard only the relation between 
diversification and value or diversification and performance; rather, the impact of 
diversification on corporate policies also needs to be examined. As most of the empirical 
evidence promoting corporate policies is for mature and industrially diversified firms (Ahn, 
Denis and Denis 2006, Duchin 2010, Ozbas and Scharfstein 2010, Chen and Chen 2011, 
Chen and Chen 2012) I do not study either well-established or industrially diversified 
companies. Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) make it clear that to the extent that industrial and 
global diversification have been initially viewed like sisters, global diversification is not a 
substitute for industrial diversification with the decision to diversify globally being self-
selected and endogenous. In the light of what I stated above, I give some thought to the 
corporate policies of initial public offerings (IPOs), topics that, like the valuation of mature 
companies, occupy an important place in financial research. 
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Since evidence is far from overwhelming for the long-term post-IPO progression 
of corporate policies of globally diversified firms, this paper scrutinizes the corporate 
policies of newly listed firms involved in international business activities. My attention is 
drawn to young companies, and I focus on the year immediately prior to their initial public 
offering, as well as on subsequent years up to ten, as it may take time for firms to adjust 
their corporate policies. I do not follow after ten years, reasoning that the firms have lost 
their juvenescence. My sample is comprised of globalized IPOs that are compared to 
domestically focused IPOs: the firms have foreign sales (FS), export sales (ES), both 
exports and foreign sales (FES) or neither foreign sales nor exports (NFES). 
The determination for “going global” and being involved in international business 
activities at this early stage is surprising (see Mauer et al. 2014).1 Firms can undertake 
diversification to spread the risk, but the IPOs are inherently risky; it is difficult for IPOs 
to use tangible resources and intangible capabilities as they may not have much of either. 
I acknowledge that young firms may grow and gain a competitive advantage from 
diversification and intrinsically increase shareholder wealth. According to Denis et al. 
(2002), Martin and Sayrak (2003), Guo (2011), Erdorf et al. (2013), and others, internal 
capital markets, agency problems, the debt-coinsurance effect (i.e., the shield against 
increased interest tax), and growth opportunities are the most plausible reasons for 
                                                   
1 It is important to review two recent titles that stand out because they yield similar, in parallel conclusions 
on the industrial and global diversification of newly issued firms. The investigation of Boulton et al. (2013) 
from 1982 to 2005 shows that industrially diversified issuers underprice less often than do focused firms. 
Lower underpricing is also discovered by Mauer et al. (2014) in globally diversified IPOs issued between 
1986 and 2010. Moreover, Mauer et al. (2014) document better long-run performance and lower failure rates 
for globally diversified IPOs than for purely domestic IPOs. 
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diversification.2 The concept behind the first theory is that internal capital markets are more 
attractive to industrially diversified firms than are external capital markets, which are 
highly imperfect. Agency problems refer either to reaping private benefits or to reducing 
firm-specific risk through diversification only as managers’ tactics to preserve the value of 
their future compensation. Reducing the volatility of cash flows allows diversified firms to 
have greater debt capacity than focused firms have; they implicitly gain a higher interest 
tax shield. Finally, a good example of growth opportunities is provided by Martin and 
Sayrak (2003). 
My methodology consists first of ordinary least squares regressions that control for 
firm and fiscal year fixed effects with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. My 
fixed effects estimation is supposed to alleviate concerns about unobservable omitted 
variables among the corporate policies regressions. However, besides unobserved 
heterogeneity and because globalization can be perceived as another corporate policy I 
suspect that my model contains endogeneity issues. These may arise in an unbalanced panel 
dataset due to various factors like a non-zero correlation between individual unobserved 
effects and globalization variables or a non-zero correlation between explanatory variables 
and idiosyncratic errors (see Semykina and Wooldridge 2010).  
Because Campa and Kedia (2002), Gomes (2004), and Villalonga (2004a) also 
regard the decision to diversify as endogenous, I proceed similarly to Adams et al. (2009). 
I address the endogeneity problem by viewing my foreign sales binary dummy not as an 
external shock to the model but as variable that is jointly determined within the system, 
                                                   
2 These theories have been empirically tested. 
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and by finding an instrumental variable for it. Oesterle et al. (2013), among many others, 
opine that ownership concentration has a strong impact on internationalization. I look at 
nine ownership variables and I prefer to use the average number of institutional owners, 
rather than the average ownership Herfindahl-Hirschman index or the average institutional 
ownership in percentage, etc. as my chosen instrument. I provide clear evidence that the 
chosen instrument is appropriate for investment and financial policies based on the high 
correlation between average number of institutional owners and pre-tax foreign income.  
The causal inference in my unique panel dataset does not change for investments 
and acquisitions, but the coefficients of the pre-tax foreign income variable do change sign 
after instrumentation. There is now a positive significant relation between investments and 
the pre-tax income from firms’ foreign operations. Firms extracting income from the sales 
of their products manufactured abroad seem likely to continue the process and be more 
engaged in capital expenditures. To put it differently IPOs, being young, do not have 
enough tangible assets like plant, equipment, and other physical resources and it seems that 
global diversification is a prominent factor in attaining more.  
I add from the perspective of global diversification to a very recent paper by Cihan 
and Tice (2015), who ponder whether industrially diversified firms are better acquirers than 
single segment firms, demonstrating that among globally diversified firms there is a higher 
propensity to acquire smaller competitors than there is for purely domestic companies. 
In addition, I find evidence for a negative causal effect of globalization on cash 
holdings in the sense that cash holdings are lower for globally diversified than for firms 
involved only in domestic activities. My result is similar to the findings of Duchin (2010), 
5 
who documents that the industrially diversified firms take advantage of “coinsurance,” 
which allows them to hold reduced amounts of cash in comparison to single-segment firms. 
Overall, my empirical results provide support to the idea that global diversification 
influences selected investment and financial corporate policies. Further, according to Certo 
et al. (2003), IPO firms provide excellent data for the examination of executive policies. 
The distinct executive compensation policies that I check are base salary, total annual 
compensation, and the pay-for-performance sensitivity calculated according to Core and 
Guay (1999). However, in this case I am not able to find an explanatory variable highly 
correlated with foreign or export sales dummies and uncorrelated with disturbances. To 
provide an example, the number of institutional owners is, as before, positively correlated 
with foreign sales (22%), only it is even more highly correlated with CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity (CEO delta) 32%. This lead resembles the findings of Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
who ascertain that concentration of institutional investor ownership is positively related to 
the performance sensitivity of managerial compensation. Supplementary to ownership 
variables, I try the idiosyncratic risk (see Aggarwal and Samwick 2003), but I am not able 
to find a good instrument for my two-stage least squares regressions. 
I also realize that I cannot examine corporate policies in isolation: I am required to 
include in each model the identical lagged corporate policy. The underlying argument in 
favor of adding the lagged policy variable is that companies operate on a continuous basis 
and for more than one year. Excluding the lagged dependent variable leaves open the 
possibility of a bias; therefore, I extend my initial model using a dynamic panel GMM 
framework. This estimation allows us to account simultaneously for the endogeneity of 
global diversification and at the same time use lags of the dependent variable. 
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This more comprehensive view supports my previously hypothesized motivations 
for investment, the likelihood of acquisitions and cash holdings. It still appears that the 
difference in R&D intensity, market leverage, and dividend policy between the diversified 
and focused firms is insignificant a year after global diversification. In addition I get a 
negative effect of globalization on the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price (CEO delta). 
According to Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014) and Chava and Purnanandam (2010), 
higher CEO delta implies that managers work more in concert with shareholders for the 
obvious reasons that they share gains and losses. The lower CEO delta in my model means 
that the receiving of foreign income acts to destabilize managerial sensitivity, consistent 
with the risk-decreasing incentives and agency explanation for the value-loss of 
diversification. (Note that Hoechle et al. [2012] in univariate statistics also find that 
diversified firms have lower pay-performance sensitivity.) 
While my dynamic models yield substantial evidence of an association between 
global activities and select policies, there could be another influence that I have not yet 
considered. I have to capture the effect that one set of policies has on the other set, because 
in practice there are interactions that may exist among them. Gatchev et al. (2010) 
demonstrate that when additional funds are received by firms, these cash flows are not used 
to increase firms’ investments or their distributions. Instead the major effect is a decline in 
leverage of $0.60 to $0.97 for each dollar of positive cash flow. My findings maintain their 
meaningful implications in the case of investments, acquisitions and CEO delta incentive. 
My results are followed by several robustness checks in which I find similar results 
when I conduct annual cross-sectional tests, when I settle on hot IPOs, and when I remove 
industrial and keep only global diversified IPOs. Further I complement my main results by 
7 
readjusting my FS, ES, FES groups of firms by applying a ten percent threshold. I also 
contract the NFES group by applying propensity score matching techniques. In both 
situations, the results hold, which translates into support for my initial models. Overall, I 
show that understanding of the corporate policies of newly listed firms can be enriched 
dramatically by considering their determination to pursue foreign activities. 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 presents theoretical 
and empirical findings that illustrate the diverse associations between globalization, 
decisions to go public, and subsequent implication for firms’ corporate policies. Section 3 
presents my data sources, describes my sample, and outlines my methodology. Section 4, 
which empirically tests the effect of diversification on newly issued companies, includes 
my results. It is followed by section 5, which examines the robustness of my empirical 
findings, and conclusion. 
 
1.2. Related Literature on Corporate Policies, Globalization and Newly Issued Firms 
In this section I revisit major investment, financial, and executive policies, since 
extant literature maintains that different combinations of them make a difference in firm 
performance.  
8 
Investments 
My IPO firms are actively developing their roles in international markets, so I infer 
that this fact reveals a unique long-term plan of action. I expect that these companies handle 
not one but two of the most important challenges that a firm can experience during its 
growth phase (Pagano, Panetta and Zingales, 1998).3 It is safe to conjecture that these firms 
pass up investment opportunities that are costly to finance externally considerably more 
often than do other companies lacking internal cash flows from operations. That is, Pagano, 
Panetta, and Zingales (1998) and Chaddad and Reuer (2009) claim to show a decrease in 
capital expenditures after a firm goes public. 4 
On the other hand, these challenges may not be so acute for mature companies. In 
their realm the consideration of the investment opportunity set and the diversification 
policy encourages two competing hypotheses: the investment opportunities hypothesis that 
states that capital investments are more valuable for focused companies and the internal 
capital markets that expresses that capital investments are more worthwhile for diversified 
firms (see Hitt et al. 1997, Khanna and Tice 2001, Scharfstein and Stein 2000, Billet and 
                                                   
3 A newly listed company that “goes public for the first time” has to contemplate many factors as it prepares 
to become capable of joining the capital markets. For example, the sources of its costs are numerous. 
According to Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998), a company going public will sustain costs ranging from 
administrative expenses and fees to expenditures associated with adverse selection and proprietary 
information. Furthermore, the entrepreneurs are motivated to sell shares of their company to the general 
public “to maximize their proceeds from selling” (Zingales 1995) or to overcome borrowing constraints 
imposed by banks and venture capital firms (Pagano, Panetta and Zingales, 1998). 
 
4 Jain and Kini (1994) find that during 1976–1988, median IPO firms exhibit higher capital expenditures than 
do other firms from the same industry three years subsequent to their IPOs. Consistent with the notion that 
IPO firms are constrained by a shortage of internal funds, Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) study a 
sample of Italian non-financial firms for eleven years (1982–1992), claiming similarity of results with firms 
in Spain or Sweden. They identify a propensity for capital expenditures to decline two years after a firm 
engages in an IPO. In the US IPO context (1991-1997), Chaddad and Reuer (2009) present results showing 
a significant drop in the capital expenditures immediately after the offering phase. Though they find that the 
relation between cash flow and capital expenditures is no stronger for younger IPO firms than it is for mature 
companies, they do warn that financial constraints do not passively lessen as these young firms develop. 
9 
Mauer 2003, Chen 2006, Ozbas and Scharfstein 2010). Shaver (2011) uses data from 
Spanish manufacturing firms to indicate a negative influence of exports on investment-
cash flow sensitivity, and Chen and Chen (2012) use US data to show a negative influence 
of industrial diversification on investment efficiency. Since exporters realize cash flows 
that are less variable than those of non-exporters, Shaver (2011) suggests that geographic 
sales diversification relaxes investment liquidity constraints. Mature firms may undertake 
diversification to utilize inherent capabilities and existing resources (surplus cash flow) 
well. Chen and Chen (2012) conclude that capital and investment allocations become more 
efficient for well-governed diversified firms because the cross-subsidization problem is 
less severe. However, if A implies B and B implies C, the question regarding the behavior 
of global diversified IPO firms still remains unanswered.  
R&D Intensity 
R&D spending, my second investment policy under consideration, is traditionally 
associated with firm value, contributing to increases in sales and profits. In the case of 
mature Spanish manufacturing companies, Hitt et al. (1997) show that international 
diversification is positively related to R&D intensity, and Alonso-Borrego and Forcadell 
(2010) reveal a bi-directional dynamic relation between industrial diversification and R&D 
intensity. Both studies use entropy as a measure of diversification that positively correlates 
with other measures previously used in the diversification literature (foreign assets to total 
assets and foreign sales to total sales).  
10 
With respect to my IPO sample, Jain and Kini (2008) assert that diversification provides 
newly public firms with a safety net during turmoil.5 Yet the debate is not settled whether 
reduced variability in cash flow allows globally diversified IPOs to increase their R&D 
productivity. Due to various constraints they may also rest on their laurels as far as 
development and commercialization of new products.  
Acquisitions 
Acquisitions, my third investment policy, may be the greatest motivation for going 
public.6 Wiggenhorn et al. (2007) demonstrate that during 1992–2001 newly public firms 
experience positive valuation effects as a result of acquisitions announcements. However, 
there is no substantial market reaction to related acquisitions (acquirers and targets in the 
same SIC code), and of course, I am only interested in diversifying acquisitions. Next, I 
agree with Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2010), who suggest that firms go public in 
order to become acquirers. Acquisitions by IPO firms apparently occur at a faster pace than 
those by mature companies in the same industry. Further, it turns out that within five years 
of their listing, IPO firms carry out acquisitions that exceed their capital expenditures 
(CAPX) and research and development (R&D) expenses.7 Nevertheless, if lack of funds is 
not the deciding factor in the propensity to acquire, it still remains to be grasped whether 
                                                   
5 Jain and Kini (2008) find no consistent relation between industry-adjusted R&D expenditures and changes 
in operating performance of US IPOs. Aggarwal et al. (2009) find no higher correlation of R&D with firm 
value for newly listed firms during the boom period of 1997-2000, nor for Internet firms, nor for tech firms. 
Darrough and Rangan (2005) show that R&D changes in the year of the offering are negatively correlated 
with managerial share sales. 
  
6 Brau and Fawcett (2006), surveying 336 CFOs, conclude that for many companies the determination to go 
public rests on their desire to be acquired and Fama and French (2004) find that 22% of firms undertaking 
IPOs disappear due to mergers within ten years (one in five new lists on average is acquired in mergers).  
 
7 This is similar to Bertrand and Schoar (2003), who talk about individual managers engaging in external 
acquisitions causing under expenditures in firms’ tangible and intangible capital. 
11 
globalized firms do more acquisitions than purely domestic firms and how that would be a 
direct effect of diversification. 
Dividends 
Mature firms usually pay dividends and repurchase stock out of free cash flow. 
Mackey (2006) finds that same factors that contribute to industrial diversification also 
solidify the likelihood of a dividend being paid out. However, in the case of young firms, 
one possibility could be that the availability of more cash flow due to synergies by means 
of economies of scope can be used to pay more dividends.8  The other possibility is that the 
external funds coming from globalization may be used for other purposes, such as empire 
building by ambitious managers.9 
Leverage 
Further discussing leverage, I revisit the idea that mature, slow-growing 
corporations globally diversify when they are driven by new attractive productive 
opportunities. Therefore, there are reasons to believe (see Mansi and Reeb 2002) that 
internationally diversified firms should have lower operational risk and subsequently 
higher leverage capacity.10  Indeed, Chkir and Cosset (2003) perform an event study and 
                                                   
8 Fama and French (2001) find that newly listed firms, even those exhibiting stable investment opportunities, 
rarely pay dividends: only 3.7% of industrial firms going public declare and pay dividends ten years after 
their IPO. In the UK, firms that go public increase their dividends at the time of the initial public offering 
and are likely to smooth dividends more than private firms and are more cautious about cutting dividends 
(Michaely and Roberts, 2011). 
 
9 I can argue in either direction based on the findings of Aggarwal et al. (2009) who find that IPOs with more 
negative earnings rank higher than do firms with less negative earnings. While obviously the firms with more 
positive earnings have higher valuations than companies with less positive earnings, the first result ostensibly 
signals the rendition of growth opportunities of internet IPOs.  
 
10 Mansi and Reeb (2002) consider book values of debt a biased proxy of the market value of debt for 
diversified firms. A later study by Glaser and Müller (2010) shows that the use of book value of debt 
underestimates the value of diversified firms. 
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report leverage increasing from the first to the third year following acquisitions of foreign 
subsidiaries. Similarly, Ahn et al. (2006) discover that managers of diversified firms have 
wide discretion in allocating debt service burden to their higher q and non-core segments.  
Searching through the latest literature I did not find any study which has addressed all nine 
corporate policies against post-IPO conditions.11 
Hence to study this I formally state my hypothesis as: 
H0 : A globally diversified firm and a purely domestic company will have the same 
corporate policies: !"# − !%# = 0 
Ha : A globally diversified firm in comparison to a purely domestic company will 
worsen its own corporate policies: !"# − !(# < 0 
 
1.3. Data 
I generate my sample of IPOs that occurred between January 1992 and December 
2014 from the Thompson Reuters SDC Platinum Global New Issues database.12 I require 
the IPOs to be based in the USA (US domicile), and I exclude all private placements, 
depositary issues, closed-end funds, trusts, limited partnerships, REITs, spinoffs, and unit 
issues; the total after exclusions is 4926 firms. Moreover, I adhere to the existing literature 
and exclude utility (SIC codes 4900-4950) and financial services firms (SIC codes 6000-
                                                   
11 Jain and Shao (2015) find that family firms maintain higher post-IPO leverage and raise less external 
capital than do non-family firms. 
 
12 The SDC Platinum Merger and Acquisition database, the industry standard for information on new issues, 
is collected by Thompson Financial.   
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6700), since the financial policies of these companies do not have the same meaning as for 
the rest or they revolve around regulatory oversight. Subsequently, I remove observations 
when the marketplace is Euro Public instead of US Public. 
Since my analysis presumes accounting and financial variables for which 
Compustat is the source, I find for each newly issued firm from SDC their affiliated gvkey. 
After this matching process, my final sample comprises 3437 firms, and the matched or 
collected companies are crosschecked with Datastream to confirm accuracy.13 The 
determination to become involved or not in global activities is captured by dummy 
variables constructed after pre-tax foreign income and export sales are downloaded. I make 
use of the Compustat Fundamentals annual updates and the Compustat Segments database 
according to the prior literature for the items PIFO and SALEXG (see Frank et al. 2015, 
Mauer et al. 2014). I divide my sample into four categories according to whether the firm 
has only foreign sales (FS), only export sales (ES), both exports and foreign sales (FES), 
or neither foreign sales nor exports (NFES). 
My contribution to the literature is the construction of a unique longitudinal 
unbalanced dataset with the investment, financial policies, and firm characteristics 
downloaded and calculated from Compustat. The executive policies are downloaded from 
the ExecuComp database – items TDC1 and Salary for total compensation and salary, 
respectively. For each firm-year (each gvkey) I identify the CEO of the firm using the 
annual CEO flag variable available from ExecuComp.14 The average number of 
                                                   
13 Matching otherwise would have brought out inconsistencies; for instance, ticker matching is problematic 
because tickers tend to change and/or they may be reused.   
 
14 During the same year the annual title sometimes reveals interim CEO, co-CEO, or branch or division CEO 
appointments.   
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institutional owners is collected from Thomson Reuters. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to prevent any awry influences of extreme 
outliers. 
To investigate whether investment, financial and executive practices of firms are 
different in the presence of global diversification my first model accounts for potential 
heterogeneity in globalization status (FS, ES, FES, NFES) for each policy: *"# = +# + -" + ./"# + 01"# + 2"#(1) 
where ity  is firm policy variable representing one of the nine policy decisions  of 
firm i in year t, for example investment, R&D intensity, acquisitions, etc. tα  are the year 
fixed effects and iβ are firm fixed effects. The key element in my model is IPO’s global 
diversification, therefore itZ is a 4x1 vector  
that denotes firm’s globalization position.  
 
and 0(154) the coefficients vector represents the firm’s preference regarding 
international activity. 
I regress each corporate policy on year -"	and firm fixed effects	+#, on firm 
characteristics /"# and firm’s globalization position	1"#. 
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1.4. Results 
I break the total sample of firms down according to their globalization status (FS, 
ES, FES, NFES) and report the annual distribution in Table 1.1. Fiscal year 1996 has the 
highest IPO count (345), and I notice a decline after 1996, although 1997 has a peak similar 
to that in 1995. The count falls below 200 after 2004; there were thus more IPOs in every 
year of the 1990s than in 2014. Further, the table shows the number and the percentage of 
firms with foreign sales (FS), export sales (ES), foreign and export sales (FES), and 
domestic-only sales (NFES). These results are for the fiscal year prior to the initial public 
offering, so until 2000 the number of IPOs making foreign sales in the prior fiscal year is 
less than the number of newly issued exporters under the same conditions. The situation 
changes abruptly after 2000: I see a dramatic drop until there are no prior-year exporters 
among firms newly issued in 2009, 2010, or 2012-2014. 
As previously mentioned, the firms’ diversification strategy is the decision to 
branch out into new domains of activity and/or new markets. Although I concentrate on 
international diversification, I consider industrial diversification somewhat as well. Firms 
are considered industrially diversified if they report more than one business segment.15 
Later the concepts of industry and geographic segments have been replaced by operating 
segments as defined by the enterprise’s management. Conglomerates are firms that claim 
operations in multiple business segments as a result of either M&A activity or other 
combinations. Figures 1.1-1.4 identify in each subsample (FS, ES, FES, and NFES) the 
                                                   
15 Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) introduce three different measures of industrial diversification: reporting of 
more than one business segment, the average number of business segments, and sales-based Herfindahl index.   
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number of industrially diversified, focused, and undetermined firms. My histograms do not 
confirm Denis, Denis and Yost’s (2002) finding that firms that are globally diversified are 
more likely to be industrially diversified as well. For example, out of 14% of total IPOs 
obtaining foreign income from operations abroad, only 14% are industrially diversified. 
That is, approximately only 2% out of the total sample carries out sales of products 
manufactured in a foreign country and report more than one business segment. In addition 
I observe a decrease in industrial diversification from 1992 till 2002 solely in the case of 
the export sales subsample so the trend over time discussed by Denis, Denis and Yost 
(2002) is vague among newly issued firms. 
The marked difference in patterns between corporate policies of globally 
diversified and domestically focused newly public firms has not received much attention 
before. Table 1.2 provides descriptive statistics: I eliminate firm-years for which data are 
missing and display mean, median, and standard deviation for all nine policies. The mean 
for the investment, research and development, leverage, and cash holdings policies of firms 
reporting foreign pre-tax income is statistically below that of domestically focused firms, 
but median is not statistically significant. That is different from the results of studies by 
Berger and Offek (1995) and Ahn et al. (2006) of industrial diversification. Berger and 
Offek (1995) show that the investment level, which is the ratio of capital expenditures to 
sales, is higher for the segments of diversified companies, and Ahn et al. (2006) find that 
the book leverage of industrially diversified firms is significantly higher than the imputed 
leverage of focused firms. At the same time, it is surprising to see that the cash holdings 
mean of firms involved in the international arena is lower than that of firms operating 
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domestically. International firms should have more reliable cash flows, and, as anticipated, 
their standard deviation is lower than that of domestic-only firms. 
Table 1.3 shows the correlation coefficients of all variables constructed and 
included in the investment model. The magnitude of the highest correlation among them is 
0.67, which is between cash flow and ROA. Given this high correlation, my analysis is run 
using only the cash flow. The next highest correlation is 0.54 between the export (ES) 
binary variable and the foreign and export (FES) dummy, and I take similar actions as 
before, at the same time noticing no correlation between FS and ES dummies. In 
descending sequence NWC is highly correlated with investment and also with ROA. The 
correlations between the other eight ownership variables that I have mentioned and the 
foreign sales dummy (not reported) are lower than 0.29, indicating that this measure, 
average number of institutional investors, captures the most information, as it is 
uncorrelated with the investment policy. The number of firm-year observations for each 
regression is different, so a correlation matrix formed from all common firm-year 
observations will have distinctive but comparable output. 
Firstly, I examine corporate policies in isolation and assume strong exogeneity of 
my globalization binary variables. Table 1.4 compares the outcomes of subsequent 
corporate policies for domestic and globalized firms. I regress corporate policies on the 
globalization dummies, year and firm fixed effects, and firm-level characteristics. Since 
both firm and time effects are present in my data, I include year dummies, and my t-
statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. The variable FS_d is not 
statistically significant in the research and development intensity model, indicating that the 
global diversified firms do not have intangible assets costs different from those of firms 
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focused on domestic markets. Dividend policies also do not exhibit clear patterns of change 
in the presence of global diversification, so I can suggest that globalization confers neither 
benefits nor disadvantages to dividend payout ratios. 
Similarly, in the case of executive compensation policies, there is no significant 
difference between firms with different diversification status; simply put, CEOs’ salaries 
and total compensation are not influenced once the firms have chosen to proceed with 
global diversification. 
The findings provide evidence of a significant negative relation between 
investments and pre-tax income. However, in all probability the firms that extract income 
from the sales of their products manufactured abroad are going to continue to do so, so 
these estimates may be misleading, caused by endogeneity arising out of simultaneous 
determination of globalization dummies and firm characteristics. The discussion of Campa 
and Kedia (2002) pertains more than ever because global diversification may be a direct 
effect of certain firm characteristics. Liquidity, solvency, profitability, and growth 
prospects in such situations may be underlying motivations for firms’ determination to 
diversify globally, and therefore my FS and ES samples are not random but self-selected.  
To alleviate endogeneity concerns I run the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Hausman 
1978), including only corporate policies and FS dummies. The initial probability of 
obtaining a chi-square statistic given a true null hypothesis is 0.847 and 0.315 for 
investment and cash holdings, respectively. However, after I include firm characteristics 
and instrument the FS dummies by the average number of institutional owners, the 
probabilities change to 0.001 and 0.003. Consequently, Durbin-Wu-Hausman rejects the 
null hypothesis of no endogeneity at the 1% level, and so it is mandatory that I re-run my 
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cross-sectional regressions after identifying the instruments for my variable of interest, 
FS_d. The variable that I use for instrumentation is the average number of institutional 
investors because it is positively related to the foreign sales dummy and unrelated to 
investment or financial policies. 
 
1.5. Methodology 
The methodology that I employ is based on directions given in Wooldridge (2010): 
to wit, I run a probit regression to regress the foreign sales binary variable on the 
aforementioned instrument and the other exogenous regressors, and I use the predicted 
FS_d and the exogenous regressors. This method enforces efficient estimates and valid 
2SLS standard errors. Indeed, my 2SLS procedure yields a positive coefficient of 0.541 on 
the foreign sales dummy with a t-statistic of 3.62 in the case of investments, a positive 
coefficient of 1.152 with a t-statistic of 5.65 for propensity to acquire, and a negative 
coefficient of −0.145 with a t-statistic of 2.23 for R&D intensity (see Table 1.5). I also find 
that global diversification is significantly negatively related to market leverage and cash 
holdings. 
Nonetheless, when investigating the effects of global diversification decisions on 
corporate policies, I cannot ignore the dynamic relation between firms’ historical decisions 
and characteristics. Keeping in mind that the present is correlated with the past and that my 
sample consists of many firms, though the number of years is few than 10, I get reliable 
results for all nine policies. In each model I check two lags but report the findings for the 
identical lagged corporate policy. My inferences remain unchanged in the case of 
investments, acquisitions, and cash holdings regressions: however, introducing first lag of 
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the dependent variable as a covariate makes the foreign sales coefficient insignificant in 
the case of leverage (see Table 1.6). Controlling for lagged executive policies reveals a 
new causal relation between CEOs’ pay for performance and global diversification. This 
new result is entirely consistent with my expectations as it is anticipated to get a negative 
coefficient due to the well-known relation between CEO delta and risk-decreasing 
incentives. I also rerun two-stage least squares estimations with added lagged regressors 
and obtain comparable (untabulated) results. These facts reinforce my opinion that the IV 
regressions were not biased and corporate policies do not behave at random in the presence 
of global diversification.  
The interdependent mechanism of how financial policies affect investment policies 
is very well known (see Gatchev et al. 2010 and Meng 2012). Tables 1.7, 1.8 presents my 
check to determine whether global diversification is still a key determinant or struggles for 
power as far as significance in such conditions. I find strong support for my hypothesis in 
case of investments, acquisitions, and delta (pay for performance), FS_d coefficients being 
significant at the 5% level and below. Note that in addition to statistical significance the 
economic significance of these effects is meaningful, given expected variation in the 
foreign markets’ conditions. 
 
1.6. Robustness of the results 
 
Firstly, my sample is divided into hot and cold IPOs based on first day underpricing. 
The hot sub-sample includes IPOs with the largest positive returns at the end of the first 
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trading day. The results strongly support my previous outcomes even when hot and cold 
IPOs are assessed a week or two weeks after the first day (Table 10 A-C). 
Secondly, my sample is changed to include IPOs only global diversified and not 
involved in industrial diversification (Table 10 A-C). In the investment’ initial regression 
the fraction of foreign sales firm-year observations from one single line of business was 
28.6% out of total number of 16,625 firm-years. Conditional only on the existence of global 
diversification tendency to acquire and investments rise, however cash holdings decrease 
only for exporters. 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 14 (FASB 1976) 
mandated the disclosure of sales and income of either industrial or geographic segment that 
was 10% or more of the firm's total. Its update or in other words the second disclosure 
SFAS No. 131 (FASB 1997) obligates companies to report sales and income 10% or more 
of all reported operating segments 
In line with the above mentioned requirements I restrict my initial FS sample to 
companies that have a ratio of pre-tax foreign income (PIFO) to book pre-tax income (PI) 
of at least ten percent. Similarly, the ES category is changed to include companies that have 
a ratio of export sales (salexg) to total sales of ten percent or more. By introducing this 
constraint I allocate more firms to the NFES group, I basically increase the percent of 
domestically focused firms. The results in Table 10 A-C are similar to my previous results, 
indicating same influence of the global diversification on same corporate policies. 
Since the assignment of firms to the globalization pool as well as to the NFES group 
is not random, I use propensity score matching and shrink my domestically focused group 
of firms. The shrinkage is motivated by the propensity score methodology, which aims to 
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reduce selection bias by using groups that are as similar as possible. I match 1:2, one 
globally diversified firm is matched with two firms domestically focused.16 Based on firms’ 
matching characteristics, which are all my independent variables, a match is accomplished 
when the propensity scores of the two firms are within 0.001.17 Dropping firms from the 
NFES pool without a close match yields unambiguous results, (Table 1.10) that clearly re-
advocate the relation between globalization and firm’s policies. I also run my dynamic 
panel estimation every year, results not reported to save space. 
 
1.7. Conclusions 
In this paper I examine a sparsely considered relation between IPOs’ choice to 
diversify globally and their corporate policies. Using a sample of 3437 companies over the 
period 1992-2014, I find a selective and not across-the-board effect of early globalization 
on investment, financial, and executive policies. I specially selected IPOs for my 
examination because I wanted to find comparable firms that are under the same stage of 
corporate life cycle and with similar growth potential.  
Given the acknowledged endogeneity in corporate finance among policies in two-
stage least squares regressions, I find that a firm that earns pre-tax foreign income at an 
early phase of its growth and development will increase its investments. Such a firm has a 
higher propensity to acquire and reduce its cash holdings; in contrast, there is no conclusive 
evidence that diversification influences dividend pay-out or leverage policy. 
                                                   
16 Accepting only one pair, in other words a 1:1 match, yields similar results. 
 
17 I implement probit regression with caliper matching in Stata 14.0 
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Once again, in a dynamic framework, when the identical lagged policy is added to 
the regression, exporting domestically produced goods and services to customers abroad 
has a significant bearing on investment and acquisition policy. I see that managers of 
globally diversified firms choose to work less intensively than their counterparts at firms 
focused on domestic markets. While their delta (pay for performance) is lower, their base 
salary and total compensation are unaffected. All my results maintain their implications for 
each aforementioned corporate policy in interdependent settings when investment and 
financial policies are paired and when executive and financial policies are paired. My paper 
generates broad-based outcomes regarding the diverse connections between globalization 
at an early stage and firms’ corporate policies. It would be well for newly listed firms to 
consider the implications of globalization for corporate decision making by taking a look 
at certain legitimate influences. 
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APPENDIX A VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
AQC_d: a dummy variable that equals 1 if acquisitions costs (AQC) divided by 
lagged total assets (AT) is greater or less than zero, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Cash Holdings: cash and short-term investments (CHE) divided by lagged net 
property, plant, and equipment (PPENT). 
Cash Holdings=CHE/lag(PPENT). 
 
Cash flow: the lagged ratio of the sum of earnings before extraordinary items (IB) 
and depreciation (DP) divided by lagged net property, plant, and equipment (PPENT). 
Cash flow=lag((DP+IB)/lag (PPENT)). 
 
Delta: the natural logarithm of the CEO’s total portfolio delta, defined as his dollar 
increase in wealth for a 1% increase in firm’s stock price. It is constructed with ExecuComp 
data using Core and Guay’s (2002) algorithm and Coles, Daniel and Naveen’s (2006) 
methodology. 
 
Div: dividends per earnings or the ratio of the sum of common dividends (DVC) 
and preferred dividends (DVP) divided by earnings before depreciation, interest, and tax 
(OIBDP). 
Div=(DVC+DVP)/ OIBDP. 
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Investment: capital expenditures (CAPX) over lagged net property, plant, and 
equipment (PPENT). 
Investment=CAPX/lag(PPENT). 
 
Leverage:  market leverage defined as long-term debt (DLTT) plus debt in current 
liabilities (DLC) divided by total assets minus total stockholders’ equity plus market value. 
Market Value MKVALT is equal to share price (PRCC_F = price close) times number of 
shares (CSHO = common shares outstanding). 
Leverage= (DLTT+DLC)/(AT-SEQ+MKVAL). 
 
NWC: net working capital defined as the lagged ratio of working capital (WCAP) 
divided by lagged total asset (AT). 
NWC=lag(WCAP/lag(AT)). 
 
R&D: the ratio of R&D expenditures (XRD) over lagged total assets (AT). 
R&D=XRD/lag(AT). 
 
ROA: the lagged ratio of EBITDA over lagged total assets (AT). 
ROA=lag((EBITDA)/lag(AT)). 
 
Salary: the natural logarithm of the dollar value of the base salary of the CEO for 
a fiscal year (ExecuComp SALARY). 
 
Size: the lagged natural logarithm of total assets (AT).  
Size=lag(log(AT)). 
 
Tobin Q: the lagged ratio of the market value of assets divided by the book value 
of assets. The market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value 
of common equity (calendar year close times shares outstanding) less the sum of the book 
value of common equity and balance sheet deferred taxes.  
Tobin Q = lag((AT+MKVAL_CALC-CEQ-TXDB)/AT) =  
lag((AT+PRCC_F*abs(CSHO) -CEQ-TXDB)/AT). 
 
Total Comp: the natural logarithm of the total compensation including option 
grants of the CEO for a fiscal year. Specifically, is the sum of cash salary, bonus, total 
value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-
Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other compensation during a fiscal year 
(Execucomp item TDC1). 
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Table 1.1: Distribution Of The Sample In Four Categories Based On The Global 
Diversification Status 
(3437 is the sample size, the total number of IPOs listed during 1992–2014) 
    Foreign Sales (FS) 
Export Sales 
(ES) 
Foreign and 
Export sales 
(FES) 
Domestic Firms 
(NFES) 
Year 
No. 
of 
IPOs 
No. of 
Foreign 
Sales 
% of 
Foreign 
Sales 
No. of  
Exports 
% of 
Export 
Sales 
No. of 
Foreign 
Sales 
and 
Exports 
% of 
Foreign 
Sales 
and 
Exports  
No. of  
Domestic 
Firms 
(NFES) 
% of 
Domestic 
Firms 
(NFES) 
1992 241 19 7.88 43 17.84 10 4.15 189 78.42 
1993 306 42 13.73 76 24.84 19 6.21 207 67.65 
1994 257 21 8.17 55 21.40 8 3.11 189 73.54 
1995 302 48 15.89 93 30.79 21 6.95 182 60.26 
1996 345 23 6.67 71 20.58 9 2.61 260 75.36 
1997 301 31 10.30 65 21.59 15 4.98 220 73.09 
1998 174 13 7.47 37 21.26 3 1.72 127 72.99 
1999 303 23 7.59 37 12.21 5 1.65 248 81.85 
2000 239 19 7.95 18 7.53 3 1.26 205 85.77 
2001 45 6 13.33 1 2.22 0 0.00 38 84.44 
2002 45 4 8.89 1 2.22 0 0.00 40 88.89 
2003 45 6 13.33 1 2.22 1 2.22 39 86.67 
2004 119 25 21.01 4 3.36 0 0.00 90 75.63 
2005 99 21 21.21 5 5.05 2 2.02 75 75.76 
2006 108 20 18.52 3 2.78 0 0.00 85 78.70 
2007 116 27 23.28 2 1.72 1 0.86 88 75.86 
2008 14 2 14.29 1 7.14 0 0.00 11 78.57 
2009 34 13 38.24 0 0.00 0 0.00 21 61.76 
2010 58 19 32.76 0 0.00 0 0.00 39 67.24 
2011 58 24 41.38 1 1.72 1 1.72 34 58.62 
2012 70 33 47.14 0 0.00 0 0.00 37 52.86 
2013 105 41 39.05 0 0.00 0 0.00 64 60.95 
2014 53 8 15.09 0 0 0 0 45 84.91 
          
Total 3437 488   514   98   2533   
This table provides the diversification status in the year prior to the IPO for the sample of 3437 IPO 
firms that went public during the period 1992-2014. 
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Table 1.2: Comparative statistics of corporate policies of diversified and domestic firms 
UNIVARIATE STATISTICS 
     
 FS (Pre-tax Foreign Income) 
ES (Export 
Sales) 
FES (Foreign 
and Export 
Sales) 
NFES 
(Domestic 
Sales) 
Investment 
N 4899 99 29 12009 
Mean 0.45 0.60 0.72 0.52 
 (0.000)*** (0.280) (0.112)  
Median 0.31 0.45 0.61 0.31 
 (0.986) (0.001)*** (0.005)***  
Std Dev 0.47 0.58 0.60 0.65 
R&D 
N 3841 84 21 8242 
Mean 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.17 
 (0.000)*** (0.324) (0.563)  
Median 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.10 
 (0.235) (0.028)** (0.004)***  
Std Dev 0.13 0.17 0.10 0.22 
AQC 
N 4841 91 27 11889 
Mean 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 0.00 
Median (0.831) (0.719) (0.574)  
 (0.000)*** (0.237) (0.893)  
Std Dev 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.11 
Leverage 
N 4890 100 29 12213 
Mean 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.16 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.604)  
Median 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.05 
 (0.439) (0.070)* (0.352)  
Std Dev 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.20 
Div 
N 4899 99 29 12072 
Mean 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.498) (0.159) (0.216)  
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.000)*** (0.289) (0.923)  
Std Dev 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.08 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.2: Continued 
UNIVARIATE STATISTICS 
     
 FS (Pre-tax Foreign Income) 
ES (Export 
Sales) 
FES (Foreign 
and Export 
Sales) 
NFES 
(Domestic 
Sales) 
Cash Holdings 
N 4899 100 29 12032 
Mean 6.25 6.36 10.98 8.03 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.320)  
Median 1.78 2.34 5.35 1.19 
 (0.001)*** (0.027)** (0.352)  
Std Dev 12.49 12.68 20.52 18.51 
Total Comp 
N 1882 18 7 2163 
Mean 7.70 7.51 7.29 7.30 
 (0.000)*** (0.504) (0.976)  
Median 7.72 7.37 7.30 7.28 
 (0.001)*** (0.634) (0.705)  
Std Dev 1.00 1.27 1.25 1.05 
Salary 
N 1884 17 7 2159 
Mean 6.19 5.54 5.61 6.06 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.009)***  
Median 6.21 5.56 5.48 6.09 
 (.0001)*** (0.001)*** (0.058)*  
Std Dev 0.53 0.38 0.31 0.51 
Delta 
N 1577 15 7 1644 
Mean 6.68 6.89 6.08 6.53 
 (0.152) (0.732) (0.089)  
Median 5.29 5.87 5.93 5.38 
 (0.116) (0.069)* (0.255)  
Std Dev 7.43 7.60 6.10 7.21 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
CORRELATION MATRIX  
 
Invest 
ment FS_p ES_p FES_p Age Size Cash_flow ROA Tobin's Q NWC MB N_INST_OWN 
IDIO_ 
VOL  
Investment 1              
FS_d -0.053 1             
ES_d 0.014 0.002 1            
FES_d 0.016 0.067 0.540 1           
Age -0.192 0.167 -0.031 -0.010 1          
Size -0.151 0.292 -0.026 -0.015 0.274 1         
Cash flow -0.129 0.131 0.011 0.016 0.071 0.246 1        
ROA -0.133 0.144 0.006 0.012 0.091 0.324 0.670 1       
Tobin's Q 0.389 -0.063 0.000 -0.004 -0.127 -0.221 -0.245 -0.304 1      
NWC 0.490 -0.087 0.012 0.012 -0.235 -0.152 -0.268 -0.433 0.311 1     
MB 0.026 0.011 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.031 -0.003 -0.004 0.047 0.015 1    
N_INST_OWN -0.011 0.291 -0.026 -0.018 0.301 0.723 0.118 0.173 0.129 -0.084 0.074 1   
IDIO_VOL 0.039 -0.100 0.014 0.007 -0.084 -0.264 -0.159 -0.217 0.115 0.070 0.001 -0.214 1  
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
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Table 1.4: Fixed effects OLS regression results. 
INVESTMENT CORPORATE POLICIES 
 Investment Aqc_d R&D 
 (1) (2) (3) 
FS_d t-1 -0.071 -0.007 0.009 
 (3.19)** (0.36) (1.67) 
ES_d t-1 0.028 0.040 0.004 
 (0.46) (0.73) (0.28) 
Age -0.009 -0.002 0.003 
 (1.33) (0.26) (1.79) 
Cash flow t-1 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.51) (3.37)** (2.54)* 
Size t-1 -0.088 0.072 -0.065 
 (7.10)** (8.06)** (15.56)** 
NWC t-1 0.191 0.017 -0.009 
 (18.64)** (4.01)** (5.75)** 
TOBIN Q t-1 0.063 0.011 0.010 
 (14.73)** (5.10)** (8.03)** 
MB t-1 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.18) (0.90) (1.06) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.54 0.50 0.81 
N 16,541 16,351 11,789 
This table shows the impact of foreign sales on firms' investment corporate policies. The dependent variables 
are in order Investment, AQC_d and R&D. The independent variables are FS_d, ES_d, FES and firm 
characteristics (Age, Cash flow, Size, NWC, Tobin Q, MB). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 
A. Standard errors are controlled for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.4: Continued 
FINANCIAL CORPORATE POLICIES 
 Leverage Div Cash Holdings 
 (4) (5) (6) 
FS_d t-1 0.004 -0.003 -2.040 
 (0.66) (1.04) (3.84)** 
ES_d t-1 -0.007 -0.011 -0.698 
 (0.89) (1.40) (0.35) 
Age 0.006 0.005 0.391 
 (2.60)** (1.70) (2.53)* 
Cash Flow t-1 -0.000 0.000 -0.119 
 (1.54) (0.90) (2.32)* 
Size t-1 0.027 0.003 -2.316 
 (8.12)** (1.69) (7.41)** 
NWC t-1 -0.007 0.002 2.463 
 (6.65)** (4.27)** (10.93)** 
Tobin Q t-1 -0.003 -0.000 0.751 
 (5.22)** (0.07) (6.77)** 
MB t-1 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (1.10) (0.98) (1.20) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.80 0.44 0.72 
N 16,801 16,595 16,591 
This table shows the impact of foreign sales on firms' financial corporate policies. The dependent variables 
are in order Leverage, Div and Cash Holdings. The independent variables are FS_d, ES_d, FES and firm 
characteristics (Age, Cash flow, Size, NWC, Tobin Q, MB). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 
A. Standard errors are controlled for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.4: Continued 
EXECUTIVE CORPORATE POLICIES 
 Salary Total Comp Delta 
 (7) (8) (9) 
FS_d t-1 -0.015 0.089 -0.179 
 (0.52) (1.40) (1.39) 
ES_d t-1 -0.066 0.189 0.115 
 (0.66) (0.71) (0.32) 
Age 0.075 0.099 0.414 
 (1.63) (0.21) (1.69) 
Cash flow t-1 0.008 0.021 0.050 
 (1.90) (1.93) (3.38)** 
Size t-1 0.125 0.287 0.084 
 (5.66)** (5.57)** (1.07) 
NWC t-1 -0.026 -0.008 0.098 
 (1.15) (0.12) (1.13) 
Tobin Q t-1 -0.002 0.042 0.085 
 (0.30) (2.51)* (4.58)** 
MB t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.35) (2.33)* (1.37) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.79 0.64 0.74 
N 4,027 4,030 3,216 
This table shows the impact of foreign sales on firms' executive corporate policies. The dependent variables 
are in order Salary, Total Comp and Delta. The independent variables are FS_d, ES_d, FES and firm 
characteristics (Age, Cash flow, Size, NWC, Tobin Q, MB). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 
A. Standard errors are controlled for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.5: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimation 
INVESTMENT CORPORATE POLICIES 
 Investment AQC_d R&D 
FS_d t-1 0.541 1.152 -0.145 
 (3.62)*** (5.65)*** (2.23)** 
Age -0.010 -0.017 0.000 
 (4.82)*** (5.04)*** (0.02) 
Cash flow t-1 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.28) (0.45) (5.12)** 
Size t-1 -0.040 0.023 -0.022 
 (4.00)*** (1.74) (3.83)*** 
NWC t-1 0.200 0.007 -0.003 
 (22.20)*** (1.34) (1.78)* 
MB t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.02) (0.98) (0.73) 
Tobin Q t-1 0.063 0.002 0.018 
 (16.81)*** (0.55) (12.60)*** 
    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 13.602 13.447 9.746 
The table presents second stage, OLS regressions, in which corporate investment policies are 
regressed on the predicted values of global diversification (foreign sales) dummy obtained during the first-
stage estimation by probit regressions and control variables used in step one. Standard errors are controlled 
for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 1.5: Continued 
FINANCIAL CORPORATE POLICIES 
 Leverage Div Cash Holdings 
FS_d t-1 -0.983 0.000 -10.633 
 (6.59)*** (0.01) (2.11)** 
Age 0.008 0.001 0.060 
 (2.55)** (1.69) (1.04) 
Cash flow t-1 0.002 0.000 -0.515 
 (2.93)*** (2.13)** (7.99)*** 
Size t-1 0.089 0.007 -0.412 
 (8.92)*** (4.05)*** (1.20) 
NWC t-1 -0.031 -0.001 3.577 
 (8.12)*** (1.13) (14.02)*** 
MB t-1 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.48) (0.29) (2.44)** 
Tobin Q t-1 -0.015 -0.001 0.988 
 (5.78)*** (1.38) (8.67)*** 
    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 13,802 13,640 13,671 
The table presents second stage, OLS regressions, in which corporate financial policies are regressed 
on the predicted values of global diversification (foreign sales) dummy obtained during the first-stage 
estimation by probit regressions and control variables used in step one. Standard errors are controlled for 
clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 1.6: Arellano–Bover - Blundell–Bond Dynamic Panel Estimation Using 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator with a lagged dependent variables as 
an additional explanatory variable 
INVESTMENT CORPORATE POLICIES 
 Investment Aqc_d R&D 
FS_d t-1 0.116 0.096 0.016 
 (2.95)*** (2.24)** (1.25) 
ES_d t-1 0.011 -0.233 0.077 
 (0.12) (1.14) (1.27) 
Age -0.018 -0.005 -0.006 
 (3.10)*** (0.67) (1.96)* 
Cash_flow t-1 0.006 0.004 0.001 
 (2.83)*** (5.01)*** (3.05)*** 
Size t-1 -0.217 -0.099 -0.096 
 (10.75)*** (6.90)*** (12.37)*** 
NWC t-1 0.227 0.060 -0.048 
 (8.09)*** (5.92)*** (5.86)*** 
Tobin Q t-1 0.051 0.007 0.008 
 (8.80)*** (2.40)** (5.98)*** 
MB t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.80) (0.29) (1.90)* 
Investment t-1 0.150   
 (8.17)***   
Aqc_d t-1  0.204  
  (11.75)***  
R&D t-1   0.319 
   (7.86)*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 13,628 13,304 9,687 
Groups 2576 2547 1876 
Avg Obs per Group 5.29 5.22 5.16 
Instruments 440 433 429 
Wald chi2 948.90 291.98 1975.92 
Arellano-Bond test -12.25 -27.45  
This table shows the impact of foreign sales on firms' corporate investment policies. The dependent 
variables are in order Investment,  AQC_d and R&D. The independent variables are lagged dependent policy, 
FS_d, ES_d, FES and firm characteristics (Age, Cash flow, Size, NWC, Tobin Q, MB). Variable definitions 
are provided in Appendix A. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.6: Continued 
FINANCIAL CORPORATE POLICIES 
 Leverage Div Cash Holdings 
FS_d t-1 -0.003 0.010 1.012 
 (0.33) (1.30) (0.95) 
ES_d t-1 -0.022 -0.026 -7.351 
 (0.81) (1.85)* (2.22)** 
Age 0.001 0.000 -0.203 
 (0.64) (0.06) (0.83) 
Cash_flow t-1 -0.000 -0.000 0.054 
 (0.00) (1.78) (0.83) 
Size t-1 0.012 0.002 -7.399 
 (2.94)*** (0.62) (11.39)*** 
NWC t-1 0.006 0.002 -0.836 
 (1.91) (0.90) (0.80) 
Tobin Q t-1 0.005 0.001 0.871 
 (6.90)*** (0.90) (6.18)*** 
MB t-1 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.85) (1.16) (1.00) 
Leverage t-1 0.790   
 (33.82)***   
Div t-1  0.253  
  (5.48)***  
Cash Holdings t-1   0.535 
   (11.18)*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 13,834 13,690 13,685 
Groups 2613 2583 2583 
Avg Obs per Group 5.29 5.30 5.30 
Instruments 440 440 440 
Wald chi2 22379.78 90.12 431.98 
Arellano-Bond test  -10.90 -8.71 
This table shows the impact of foreign sales on firms' corporate financial policies. The dependent 
variables are in order Leverage, Div and Cash Holdings. The independent variables are lagged dependent 
policy, FS_d, ES_d, FES and firm characteristics (Age, Cash flow, Size, NWC, Tobin Q, MB). Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * refer 
to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.6: Continued 
EXECUTIVE CORPORATE POLICIES 
 Salary Total Comp Delta 
FS_D t-1 -0.032 0.045 -0.468 
 (0.56) (0.29) (2.29)** 
ES_D t-1 -0.458 -0.345 -0.083 
 (3.18)*** (0.55) (0.34) 
Age 0.009 -0.005 0.013 
 (1.48) (0.36) (0.49) 
Cash flow t-1 0.003 0.005 0.019 
 (0.90) (0.49) (1.34) 
Size t-1 -0.004 0.097 -0.331 
 (0.12) (1.33) (3.56)*** 
NWC t-1 0.005 0.042 -0.098 
 (0.20) (0.45) (0.91) 
Tobin Q t-1 -0.003 0.024 -0.068 
 (0.50) (1.21) (2.27)** 
MB t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.88)* (1.48) (1.66)* 
Salary t-1 0.548   
 (7.97)***   
Total Comp t-1  0.115  
  (2.90)***  
Delta t-1   0.58 
   (9.70)*** 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 3,324 3,311 2,565 
Groups 592 594 488 
Avg Obs per Group 5.61 5.57 5.26 
Instruments 317 317 315 
Wald chi2 1510.41 223.92 4987.16 
Arellano-Bond test -6.20 -10.37 -8.60 
This table shows the impact of foreign sales on firms' corporate executive policies. The dependent 
variables are in order Salary, Total Comp and Delta. The independent variables are lagged dependent policy, 
FS_d, ES_d, FES and firm characteristics (Age, Cash flow, Size, NWC, Tobin Q, MB). Variable definitions 
are provided in Appendix A. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.7: Arellano–Bover / Blundell–Bond dynamic panel estimation using generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator with a lagged dependent variable, a financial 
policy, and its lag as additional explanatory variables 
INVESTMENT CORPORATE POLICIES 
  
 Investment 
FS_D t-1 0.091 0.121 0.109 
 (2.25)** (3.09)*** (2.78)*** 
ES_D t-1 0.127 0.009 0.017 
 (1.15) (0.10) (0.18) 
Investment t-1 0.100 0.151 0.139 
 (5.28)*** (8.17)*** (8.12)*** 
Cash_Holdings t 0.018   
 (11.89)***   
Cash Holdings t-1 0.004   
 (2.48)**   
Div t  0.100  
  (1.22)  
Div t-1  0.103  
  (1.44)  
Leverage t   -0.071 
   (1.14) 
Leverage t-1   -0.396 
   (4.60)*** 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 13,581 13,575 13,484 
Groups 2,576 2,576 2,572 
Avg Obs per Group 5.27 5.27 5.24 
Instruments 442 442 442 
Wald chi2 1,227.49 958.73 1,020.81 
Arellano-Bond Test -12.84 -12.21 -12.23 
Investment is the dependent variable. Independent variables include lagged dependent policy, FS_d, 
ES_d, FES, and firm characteristics (Age, Cash Flow, Size, NWC, Tobin Q, MB), Leverage and First Lag, 
Div and First Lag, Cash Holdings and First Lag. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.7: Continued 
INVESTMENT CORPORATE POLICIES 
  
 AQC_d 
FS_D t-1 0.099 0.106 0.093 
 (2.34)** (2.51)** (2.18)** 
ES_D t-1 -0.281 -0.282 -0.284 
 (1.40) (1.40) (1.42) 
AQC t-1 0.204 0.205 0.197 
 (11.82)*** (11.84)*** (11.42)*** 
Cash_holdings t -0.000   
 (1.06)   
Cash holdings t-1 0.001   
 (1.76)*   
Div t  0.026  
  (0.36)  
Div t-1  0.051  
  (0.59)  
Leverage t   0.180 
   (3.42)*** 
Leverage t-1   -0.393 
   (6.85)*** 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 13,138 13,153 13,060 
Groups 2,545 2,546 2,541 
Avg Obs per Group 5.16 5.17 5.14 
Instruments 432 432 432 
Wald chi2 292.68 2145.45 357.82 
Arellano-Bond Test   -27.13 
Propensity to acquire is the dependent variable. Independent variables include lagged dependent 
policy, FS_d, ES_d, FES and firm characteristics (Age, Cash Flow, Size, NWC, Tobin Q, MB), Leverage 
and First Lag, Div and First Lag, Cash Holdings and First Lag. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 
A. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.8: Arellano–Bover / Blundell–Bond dynamic panel estimation using generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator with a lagged dependent variable, an investment 
policy, and its lag as additional explanatory variables 
FINANCIAL CORPORATE POLICIES 
  
 Cash Holdings 
FS_d t-1 0.765 0.831 1.245 
 (0.68) (0.85) (0.91) 
ES_d t-1 -15.108 -5.806 -12.119 
 (3.31)** (1.90) (3.07)** 
Cash Holdings t-1 0.533 0.626 0.517 
 (10.56)** (12.12)** (10.53)** 
Investment t  2.925  
  (3.86)**  
Investment t-1  -5.893  
  (10.60)**  
AQC_d t -0.523   
 (2.26)*   
AQC_d t-1 -0.177   
 (0.74)   
R&D t   11.359 
   (2.80)** 
R&D t-1   11.864 
   (3.88)** 
Year Dummies    
Obs 13,138 13,581 9,474 
Groups 2,545 2,576 1,860 
Avg Obs per Group 5.16 5.27 5.09 
Instruments 432 442 429 
Wald chi2 428.21 638.87 391.92 
Arellano-Bond Test -8.56 -9.25 -8.39 
Cash holdings is the dependent variable. Independent variables include lagged dependent policy, 
FS_d, ES_d, and firm characteristics (Age, Cash Flow, Size, NWC, Tobin Q, MB), Investment and First Lag, 
AQC_d and First Lag, R&D Intensity and First Lag. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 1.9: Arellano–Bover / Blundell–Bond dynamic panel estimation using generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator with a lagged dependent variable, a financial 
policy and its lag as additional explanatory variables 
EXECUTIVE CORPORATE POLICIES 
  
 Delta 
FS_d t-1 -0.437 -0.430 -0.258 
 (1.75)* (1.66)* (1.21) 
ES_d t-1 0.027 -0.061 -0.156 
 (0.11) (0.30) (0.79) 
Delta t-1 0.592 0.581 0.531 
 (8.14)*** (8.00)*** (6.24)*** 
Cash Holdings t 0.013   
 (2.34)**   
Cash Holdings t-1 -0.006   
 (1.43)   
Div t  -1.524  
  (1.67)*  
Div t-1  -0.607  
  (1.15)  
Leverage t   -3.305 
   (6.12)*** 
Leverage t-1   1.009 
   (1.42) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1,970 1,970 1,953 
Groups 441 441 439 
Avg Obs per Group 4.47 4.47 4.45 
Instruments 302 302 302 
Wald chi2 4,432.52 4,155.08 6,664.85 
Arellano-Bond test -7.66 -7.38 -7.63 
Delta is the dependent variable. Independent variables include lagged dependent policy, FS_d, 
ES_d, FES and firm characteristics (Age, Cash Flow, Size, NWC, Tobin Q, MB), Leverage and First Lag, 
Div and First Lag, Cash Holdings and First Lag. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.10: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimation 
INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL CORPORATE POLICIES 
  Investment AQC_d R&D 
 
Hot Glob_only 10%_threshold Hot Glob_only 10%_threshold Hot Glob_only 10%_threshold 
FS_d 0.474 0.516 0.514 0.835 1.092 1.262 -0.026 -0.127 -0.172 
 (4.52)*** (3.69)*** (3.14)*** (5.90)*** (5.80)*** (5.60)*** (0.61) (2.04)** (2.78)*** 
N 13,595 13,602 13,602 13,440 13,447 13,447 9,744 9,746 9,746 
          
          
 Leverage Div Cash Holdings 
 Hot Glob_only 10%_threshold Hot Glob_only 10%_threshold Hot Glob_only 10%_threshold 
FS_d -0.795 -0.949 -0.767 -0.008 -0.001 0.031 0.286 -10.511 -15.615 
 (8.15)** (6.84)*** (5.28)*** (0.31) (0.02) (0.77) (0.10) (2.20)** (2.40)** 
N 13,795 13,802 13,802 13,633 13,640 13,640 13,664 13,671 13,671 
The table presents second stage, OLS regressions, in which corporate investment and financial policies are regressed on the predicted values of global 
diversification (foreign sales) dummy, obtained during the first-stage estimation by probit regressions, and control variables used in step one. The original 
sample is modified and three new samples are constructed such as foreign sales binary variable refers to global diversified hot IPOs, global diversified and not 
industrial diversified IPOs, and global diversified IPOs with a ratio of foreign sales to total sales higher than 10%. Standard errors are controlled for clustering 
at the firm level. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.11: Robustness. Arellano–Bover / Blundell–Bond Dynamic Panel Estimation 
Using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator with a lagged dependent 
variable as an additional explanatory variable. 
 
INVESTMENT CORPORATE POLICIES 
  
 Investment AQC_d 
 Hot Glob_only 
10%_ 
Hot Glob_only 
10%_ 
threshold threshold 
FS_D t-1 0.111 0.127 0.125 0.115 0.103 0.123 
 (2.63)*** (3.53)*** (2.67)*** (2.54)** (2.43)** (2.34)** 
ES_D t-1 0.122 -0.001 -0.022 -0.25 -0.173 -0.008 
 (1.21) (0.01) (0.41) (1.14) (0.85) (0.15) 
Investment t-1 0.152 0.15 0.147    
 (8.19)*** (8.12)*** (8.00)***    
AQC_d t-1    0.202 0.205 0.203 
    (11.65)*** (11.84)*** (11.86)*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 13,621 13,628 13,628 13,297 13,304 13,304 
Groups 2572 2576 2576 2543 2547 2547 
Avg Obs per Group 5.3 5.29 5.29 5.23 5.22 5.22 
Instruments 432 440 488 431 433 479 
Wald chi2 973.23 936.22 937.17 290.87 293.61 278.47 
Arellano-Bond test -12.25 -12.24 -12.27 -27.36 -27.49 -27.38 
This table shows the impact of foreign sales on firms' corporate investment policies. The dependent 
variables are Investment and AQC_d. The independent variables are lagged dependent policy, FS_d, ES_d, 
and firm characteristics (Age, Cash flow, Size, NWC, Tobin Q). Firm characteristic are not reported to 
conserve space Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. The original sample is modified and three 
new samples are constructed such as foreign sales binary variable refers to global diversified hot IPOs, global 
diversified and not industrial diversified IPOs, and global diversified IPOs with a ratio of foreign sales to 
total sales higher than 10%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.11: Continued 
INVESTMENT & FINANCIAL CORPORATE POLICIES 
       
 R&D Leverage 
 Hot Glob_only 
10%_ 
Hot Glob_only 
10%_ 
threshold threshold 
FS_D t-1 0.031 0.018 0.012 -0.01 -0.001 -0.02 
 (2.41)** (1.43) (0.91) (1.27) (0.17) (1.90)* 
ES_D t-1 0.074 0.079 -0.023 -0.036 -0.018 -0.016 
 (1.14) (1.42) (1.73)* (1.44) (0.72) (1.55) 
Leverage t-1    0.786 0.788 0.779 
    (33.63)*** (33.66)*** (33.61)*** 
R&D t-1 0.32 0.32 0.311    
 (7.87)*** (7.93)*** (7.81)***    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 9,684 9,687 9687 13,827 13,892 13,834 
Groups 1873 1876 1876 2609 2613 2613 
Avg Obs per Group 5.17 5.16 5.16 5.3 5.29 5.29 
Instruments 427 429 483 432 440 495 
Wald chi2 703.99 1995.79 1925.03 2100.39 22142.1 21516.69 
Arellano-Bond test -9.84   . -15.81   . 
This table shows the impact of foreign sales on firms' corporate investment and financial policies. 
The dependent variables are R&D and Leverage. The independent variables are lagged dependent policy, 
FS_d, ES_d, and firm characteristics (Age, Cash flow, Size, NWC, Tobin Q). Firm characteristic are not 
reported to conserve space. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. The original sample is modified 
and three new samples are constructed such as foreign sales binary variable refers to global diversified hot 
IPOs, global diversified and not industrial diversified IPOs, and global diversified IPOs with a ratio of foreign 
sales to total sales higher than 10%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.11: Continued 
FINANCIAL CORPORATE POLICIES 
 Div Cash Holdings 
 
Hot Glob_only 10%_ threshold Hot Glob_only 
10%_ 
threshold  
FS_d t-1 0.008 0.011 -0.015 1.997 1.007 1.973 
 (1.11) (1.58) (1.47) (1.69)* (1.01) (1.5) 
ES_d t-1 -0.023 -0.024 0 -7.061 -6.976 -0.957 
 (1.64) (1.82)* (0.02) (2.38)** (2.09)** (0.93) 
Div t-1 0.254 0.254 0.255    
 (5.47)*** (5.48)*** (5.57)***    
Cash Holdings t-1    0.542 0.534 0.533 
    (11.18)*** (11.17)*** (11.04)*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Obs 13,683 13,751 13,690 13,678 13,772 13,685 
Groups 2579 2583 2583 2579 2583 2583 
Avg Obs per Group 5.31 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 
Instruments 432 440 495 432 440 495 
Wald chi2 89.23 90.28 83.02 431.55 429.44 438.57 
Arellano-Bond test -10.89 -10.9 -10.96 -8.76 -8.7 -8.72 
This table shows the impact of foreign sales on firms' corporate financial policies. The dependent 
variables are Div and Cash Holdings. The independent variables are lagged dependent policy, FS_d, ES_d, 
FES and firm characteristics (Age, Cash flow, Size, NWC, Tobin Q). Firm characteristic are not reported. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. The original sample is modified and three new samples are 
constructed such as foreign sales binary variable refers to global diversified hot IPOs, global diversified and 
not industrial diversified IPOs, and global diversified IPOs with a ratio of foreign sales to total sales higher 
than 10%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.11: Continued 
EXECUTIVE CORPORATE POLICIES 
 Salary Total Comp 
 
Hot Glob_only 10%_ threshold Hot Glob_only 
10%_ 
threshold 
FS_d t-1 -0.017 -0.013 -0.024 0.034 0.053 -0.095 
 (0.27) (0.23) (0.7) (0.21) (0.35) (0.88) 
ES_d t-1 -0.446 -0.46 0.014 -0.396 -0.324 0.367 
 (3.10)*** (3.13)*** (0.3) (0.64) (0.52) (2.09)** 
Salary t-1 0.555 0.55 0.561    
 (8.07)*** (7.92)*** (8.10)***    
Total Comp t-1    0.112 0.112 0.109 
    (2.84)*** (2.84)*** (2.82)*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 3,324 3324 3,324 3,311 3,311 3,311 
Groups 592 592 592 594 594 594 
Avg Obs per Group 5.61 5.61 5.61 5.57 5.57 5.57 
Instruments 311 317 395 311 317 393 
Wald chi2 1736.78 1481.33 833.55 233.1 230.64 213.08 
Arellano-Bond test -6.17 -6.2 -6.04 -10.34 -10.34 -10.45 
This table shows the impact of foreign sales on firms' corporate executive policies. The dependent 
variables are in order Salary, Total Comp and Delta. The independent variables are lagged dependent policy, 
FS_d, ES_d, FES and firm characteristics (Age, Cash flow, Size, NWC, Tobin Q). Firm characteristics are 
not reported. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. The original sample is modified and three 
new samples are constructed such as foreign sales binary variable refers to global diversified hot IPOs, global 
diversified and not industrial diversified IPOs, and global diversified IPOs with a ratio of foreign sales to 
total sales higher than 10%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
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Table 1.11: Continued  
EXECUTIVE CORPORATE POLICIES 
 Delta 
 
Hot Glob_only 10%_threshold 
FS_d t-1 -0.32 -0.445 -0.244 
 (1.49) (2.36)** (1.91)* 
ES_d t-1 -0.105 -0.061 -0.041 
 (0.41) (0.25) (0.22) 
Delta t-1 0.579 0.569 0.532 
 (9.47)*** (9.67)*** (9.15)*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 2,565 2,565 2,565 
Groups 488 488 488 
Avg Obs per Group 5.26 5.26 5.26 
Instruments 308 315 379 
Wald chi2 4891 5106.67 3892.46 
Arellano-Bond test -8.67 -8.64 -8.85 
This table shows the impact of foreign sales on firms' corporate executive policies. The dependent 
variables is Delta. The independent variables are lagged dependent policy, FS_d, ES_d, FES and firm 
characteristics (Age, Cash flow, Size, NWC, Tobin Q). Firm characteristics are not reported. Variable definitions 
are provided in Appendix A. The original sample is modified and three new samples are constructed such as 
foreign sales binary variable refers to global diversified hot IPOs, global diversified and not industrial diversified 
IPOs, and global diversified IPOs with a ratio of foreign sales to total sales higher than 10%. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1.1: Graphical description with respect to both global and industrial diversification - 
Foreign Sales 
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Figure 1.2: Graphical description with respect to both global and industrial diversification - 
Export Sales  
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Figure 1.3: Graphical description with respect to both global and industrial diversification - 
Foreign and Export Sales  
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Figure 1.4: Graphical description with respect to both global and industrial diversification - 
Domestic 
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CHAPTER 2: THE IMPACT OF SARBANES OXLEY ACT ON INDUSTRIAL 
DIVERSIFICATION 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Corporate governance includes all procurements that ensure that the resources of 
the firm are overseen efficiently in light of a legitimate concern for the suppliers of money. 
The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act or Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) was passed into law in 2002 after a series of alarming, high-profile financial 
scandals with companies such as Enron and WorldCom. Congress passed SOX with the 
intent that it would rebuild trust in corporate America. As such, after 2002 there has been 
a substantial commitment to strong corporate governance practices. This discussion looks 
into the benefits and costs of SOX thru an inquiry of whether valuation of conglomerates 
have been influenced by the corporate governance provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
Over the last half century, numerous companies have pursued large expansion 
programs, including Enron. Whether such expansion is of benefit came about because of 
initial results from Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Offek (1995) showing that 
unrelated diversification reduces firm value. Meanwhile, other studies have advanced 
conflicting views that diversification improves firm value or has no quality decreasing 
impact. Similarly there is a debate and empirical evidence exposing both positive and 
negative constructive firm value and performance following the SOX legislation.  
Prior to SOX, auditing firms (watchdogs for investors) were self-regulated. They 
were also allowed to perform non-audit functions and consulting work for the same firms 
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that they audited. As a result, there was a high probability of conflict of interest. Section 
201 of SOX was mainly intended to alleviate and lessen the problems of biased beliefs and 
moral hazard by increasing independent oversight and regulation of the audit committee.18 
It was believed that oversight by a vigilant board would help reduce the negative 
impact of biased beliefs. Subsequent to SOX, both the New York Stock Exchange and 
NASDAQ stock market passed new rules expecting that the boards of their listed 
companies would consist of a majority of independent directors.19 
This study explores whether or not “governance in action” has harmed firms and 
decreased firm value in the post-SOX period. While SOX compliance has prompted 
compelling and effective empirical investigations (e.g., Jain and Rezaee, 2006; Zhang, 
2007; Li, Pincus and Rego, 2008 among others), this question has not been previously 
answered. 20  The results indicate a deflation in excess value after SOX and this is exactly 
as expected because companies have achieved broad changes in execution. Results and 
detailed explanations are given in Section 4. Considering the determinants of the 
diversification discount it is also possible that some of the drivers of the value impact of 
diversification have been moderated downwards.21 
                                                   
18 Contributing to the interaction between corporate fraud and monitoring Li (2013) establishes that fraud 
rate increases with PPS (pay for performance sensitivity) and decreases with institutional ownership while 
fraud detection as anticipated improves with qualified auditor’s opinion. 
 
19 In a similar vein with Linck et al. (2009), I aggregate as SOX the Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Investor Protection Act and the new rules of major exchanges, and I acknowledge that these implementations 
are part of more extensive changes.  
 
20 These studies report positive abnormal stock returns around SOX events illustrating that passage of the 
Act was followed by the market with keen interest. Using event studies Zhang (2007) and Litvak (2007) 
document the opposite i.e., negative stock-price ex-ante reactions to SOX legislation preparation.  
 
21 Bartov and Cohen (2008) show a decrease in the recurrence of simply meeting or beating analyst earnings 
expectations in the post-SOX period. 
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A differences-in-differences estimation is utilized to compare changes in excess 
value for accelerated filers pure-play and multi-segment corporations before and after 
SOX. The analysis show no support for the interpretation that industrially diversified firms 
are differentially affected. 
Additionally, all firms in 2002 are examined and I find SOX to have a positive 
influence on the number of business segments. This evidence does not seem to support 
Zhang (2007) who reports negative market reactions around key SOX events. 
Notwithstanding, there are studies describing positive market reactions to SOX (Jain and 
Rezaee 2006 and Li et al. 2008). In Zhang’s empirical findings, specifically in the abnormal 
returns regressions, the coefficient for the number of segments is negative and significant.22 
The conclusion then hinges on the concept that additional SOX compliance costs obstruct 
firm value more for complex businesses.  
Without tabulating their results Gao, Wu and Zimmerman (2009) report a smaller 
difference in the number of segments between non-accelerated and accelerated filers for 
the post- than the pre-SOX period.23 Non-accelerated filers have fewer segments than the 
accelerated fillers pre-SOX (1.70 vs. 1.76), however, the distinction is slimmer in the post-
SOX period (2.14 vs. 2.17). In regards to accelerating reporting requirements of Section 
403 specifically, I do not find that this played any active role in the analysis of excess value 
and multi-segment diversification.  
                                                   
22 As before, the complexity of the company was assessed by the number of its segments, which equals the 
number of different four-digit SIC industries. 
 
23 Implicitly accepting that global and industrial diversification brings much higher Section 404 compliance 
costs, Gao, Wu and Zimmerman (2009) reveal an increased probability of having foreign operations post-
SOX for accelerated filers. 
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This study contributes to the existing literature by documenting the characteristics 
of diversification in the post-SOX period. A unique aspect of the paper is the investigation 
of whether Sarbanes Oxley act influences differentially the non-accelerated or accelerated 
focused and diversified filers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys extant literature and 
discusses the hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the research design and Section 4 delivers 
empirical findings and corresponding explanations and robustness. Conclusions for the 
main findings are summarized in Section 5.  
2.2. Hypotheses development 
I blend my literature review from two streams of prior literature: the governance-
diversification linkage and the ongoing debate about the advantages and expenses of SOX. 
Coates and Srinivasan (2014) would classify my analysis as “Event studies of net 
shareholder wealth effects” or “Other research related to SOX” in their survey of the 
reactions of the researchers to the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002. Studying how SOX regulation affects corporate diversification is 
as important as showing that during the 2007-2009 financial crisis the valuation of 
conglomerates grew larger (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010).  
First, certain governance structures have always been connected to better 
performance and higher firm value.24 Anticipating the theoretical arguments regarding the 
influence of governance on firm value Schoar (2002) suggests that it is “crucial to 
                                                   
24Using 24 distinct corporate-governance provisions, Gompers et al. (2003) confer that there is a strong 
correlation between governance and positive abnormal returns, investors earning about 8.5 percent per year 
from buying (selling) firms with weak (strong) shareholder rights. 
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understand how governance structures within a firm interact with managerial” 
diversification decisions for firms diversified across different lines of business. Under this 
view, (May 1995, Palia and Lichtenberg 1999, Anderson et al. 2000, Lins and Servaes 
2002, Denis et al. 2002) propose that enhanced corporate governance acts as a limiting 
factor to massive industrial diversification campaigns.25  
The extensive diversification literature is augmented by Hoechle et al. (2012) who 
argues that there is positive relation between a company’s governance structure and multi-
segment diversification. Their study provides several analyses, a panel data regression, a 
Heckman selection model and dynamic GMM panel models. They add many governance 
variables, in addition to the prior variables that have received attention in the literature, 
such as CEO, board and institutional ownership, board size, board independence, board 
classification, board activity and board attendance among others. To the extent that 
corporate governance quality and diversification across industries are complementary 
determinants, their analysis indicates that somewhere around 21% of the diversification 
discount emerges on account of combinations about which corporate governance 
parameters conglomerates should embrace.  
Second, regarding the benefits and costs of SOX, there are two separate questions 
that are important to examine:  
                                                   
25 The most astonishing managerial entrenchment (10% to 30%) is the driver factor of the diversification 
discount in seven Asian emerging markets (Lins and Servaes 2002). The interpretation of these findings relate 
agency problems more than midway to value-reducing diversification strategies (Aggarwal and Samwick 
2003, Laeven and Levine 2007, and Andreou, Doukas, Louca, and Malmendier 2010). 
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A. Does SOX enactment have no effect on the relation between diversity and 
excess value? or 
B. Does SOX legislative decrease the diversification discount? 
To argue for (a) that the Act does not have any meaningful effect on the debated 
diversification discount, I state that all publicly traded companies are aware of the Act as 
well as their shareholders. Although investors trust SOX to reduce information uncertainty, 
this non-interference could be reasoned due to two perspectives. It is still unclear whether 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has resulted in beneficial outcomes and on top of that the outcome 
of diversification has not been the one expected.26 
Generally, the diversification discount first posited by Berger and Offek (1995) has 
been extensively deliberated. Among the many prevalent explanations for its existence, 
there are two key theories: low valuation due to well-assorted agency problems and due to 
over investment/cross subsidization in distressed segments (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; 
Rajan et al., 2000).27  
Managers charge that transparency is a feasible justification to focus on the 
domestic market, however, Thomas (2002) and Clarke et al. (2004) found similar or even 
less asymmetric information levels among conglomerates and stand-alone firms. 
Consistent with prior studies, this paper considers the information asymmetry gap between 
CEO and the market that has theoretically shrunk since SOX. Such transparency 
                                                   
26 Sarbanes-Oxley was initially attacked as forcing direct and indirect overwhelming costs (Wintoki 2007, 
Engel et al., 2007, Piotroski and Srinivasan, 2008). 
 
27 I circumvent an in-depth industrial diversification discussion (e.g., the endogeneity of the diversification 
decision in empirical models (Campa and Kedia 2000), COMPUSTAT segment data bias Harris (1998) and 
Villalonga (2004b), and ad hoc industry segment reporting (Villalonga 2004a). Examples also include book 
values of debt as incorrect input to the calculation Mansi and Reeb 2002. 
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purportedly has been reduced equally for focused or diversified firms. Hence, what 
happens when a risk averse CEO has private information about the conglomerate that 
cannot be successfully transferred to the market? Or what happens when a CEO is wary of 
personal liability as a result of strict tenets that have led to increased odds for stiffer 
penalties and punishment.28 Section 404 brought up adjustments in CEO roles and 
responsibilities, which may not positively incentivize all CEOs in all circumstances. It 
could also be that although the capital market signals positive abnormal returns, the pros 
of diversification are less than the cons of SOX. In all of these presumptions, the passage 
of the Act may shape the diversification discount in a different form when compared to the 
past. 
 
B. Does SOX legislative decrease the diversification discount? 
 
The following assertions are made to investigate (b). First, the Act has wealth-
increasing effects from the point of view of shareholders. Theoretically, it aligns their 
interests better with those of managers and SOX’s impelled advantages altogether exceed 
its costs (i.e., Jain and Rezaee, 2006). Further, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) 
demonstrate that accounting conservatism has a positive effect on the valuation of firms 
                                                   
28 Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2007) and Billet, Garfinkel and Jiang (2011) calculate CPS (CEO pay slice) 
the ratio of CEO total compensation to all top five executives. CPS is estimated to be a proxy for CEO 
influence among management team members and it turns out to be a strong determinant of firm value as 
measured by Tobin’s Q. 
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among those where initially compliance was not prevalent.29 This category of firms have 
the most noteworthy valuation changes, rather than those that were compliant at the 
beginning. In other words the diversification discount shrinks when corporate governance 
plays a concerted role. 
Second, SOX Section 404 makes it compulsory for each company to include a 
management report in its annual reports. The management report has to include the 
management’s evaluation of the firm’s internal control system regarding financial 
reporting. It requires all the weaknesses identified to be disclosed in the management 
report. The management report is required to be certified by both the CEO and CFO who 
are now strictly liable. SOX section 404 mandates that accelerated filers disclose all 
internal control weaknesses and forces reliance on the pressure that has flowed from 
disclosing such flaws in internal control.30 The fear of litigation and penalties due to weak 
internal control systems encourages companies to change their internal control systems. As 
such, SOX has contributed both directly and indirectly to improvements in company 
internal control systems. Therefore, shareholders consent more eagerly to leaving cash 
within the firm because internal control weakness disclosures are available. Such 
disclosures can be utilized by investors to reexamine their standard assumptions about firm 
value. When weaknesses are disclosed investors beliefs about the firm value are 
                                                   
29 Apart from SOX, Aggarwal et al. (2009) find that firms with higher levels of internal governance in 
countries where external governance mechanisms are more prevalent are linked to higher valuations. 
Aggarwal et al. (2009) uses the Corporate Governance Quotient from the Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS). They allocate a value of one to a governance trait if the organization meets that standard and zero 
otherwise, and then scale the total for each firm between 0 and 1. 
 
30 Firms with market capitalization above $75 million are classified as accelerated filers. 
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reconsidered in a descending way (Hammersley et al. 2008, Ashbaugh et al. 2009). SOX 
also sheds light on the extent to which firms will incur expenses related to strengthening 
their internal control systems to avoid negative statements and negative publicity.31 
Berger and Offek (1995) is the first diversification study followed by others to 
conclude that overinvestment and cross-subsidization determine the value loss. Chen and 
Chen (2012) examine internal and external governance structures and conclude that capital 
and investment allocations are more efficient for well-governed diversified firms and the 
cross-subsidization problem is less severe. At the same time, Bargeron et al. (2010) and 
Kang et al. (2010) conjecture that the new compliance is the reason for more vigilant 
investments as prompted by CEO risk aversion. Therefore, I anticipate that overinvestment 
and cross-subsidization will be considerably more carefully planned when firms uncover 
material weaknesses in their financial controls and anticipate repercussions for such 
shortcomings. 
As the objective of SOX has been to enhance corporate governance and internal 
control reporting I hypothesize a diminished diversification discount with or without a 
continuous trend. 
H1: U.S. corporations will have a lowered valuation discount due to internal capital 
markets’ favorable reaction to the SOX legislation. 
Furthermore, I forecast that: 
                                                   
31 Some firms deregister after SOX as a consequence of high compliance costs (Engel et al. 2007) and some 
firms revert to private status as insiders are challenged by increased probabilities of being prosecuted (Leuz 
et al. 2008). 
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H2: The degree of multi-industry diversification is lower after SOX as a reroute 
strategy due to CEOs adopting less risky actions. 
2.3. Data 
The principal data source is Compustat (Compustat Segment data and Compustat 
Fundamentals Annual updates) and the second is AuditAnalytics. I rely on 1999 through 
2015 data because Audit Analytics began capturing accelerated filer status disclosure in 
2000.  
I gauge diversification and legislation effects on firm value by imputing stand-alone 
values for individual segments. Compustat does not provide systematic information for 
firms’ business segments.32 I only know that the information for assets and sales, for 
example, represents at least ten percent of total assets and total sales respectively.  
Taking after the Berger and Offek methodology, presented in Appendix B, I 
exclude the firm-years for which sum of the segment sales or assets diverges more than 5 
percent from the firm’s sale or assets, respectively. Similarly, I prevent excessive 
fragmentation and inaccuracy by removing businesses with sales less than $20 million and 
firms that belong or have segments in the financial services industry (SIC codes between 
6000 and 6999). To prevent the undesirable impact of outliers, all continuous variables 
except the dummies, presented in Appendix A, are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
  
                                                   
32 There is a line of literature by Harris (1998) or Villalonga (2004a) arguing that COMPUSTAT segment 
data dependent upon ad hoc industry segment reporting choices are supportive of achieving a diversification 
discount. 
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2.4. Empirical investigation and robustness 
The empirical model relating changes in excess value to SOX is as follows: Excess	Value = α + β/ ∗ Div_d + β6 ∗ SOX_d + β: ∗ Leverage + β> ∗ Capx_sale + βA ∗ Ebit_Sale + βD ∗ Log_at	 (1) Excess	Value = α + β/ ∗ N_seg + β6 ∗ SOX_d + β: ∗ Leverage + β> ∗ Capx_sale + βA ∗ Ebit_Sale + βD ∗ Log_at (2) 
 
All dependent and independent variables are defined in Appendix A, Capx_sale 
proxies for growth opportunities, Ebit_Sale for profitability, and Log_at for firm size. 
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, 25th and 75th 
percentiles) for the excess value and continuous control variables. Table 2.2 confirms that 
excess value calculated with the sales multiplier declines from -0.080 in the period before 
SOX to -0.148 after SOX. A similar significant decrease occurs in leverage. Size and 
operating income per sale (profitability) manifest a significant increase at 1% in the post-
SOX period. After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, growth opportunities present changes that are 
not statistically significant.  
Table 2.3 reports Pearson correlations between the variables for the sample with 
excess value calculated with sales multipliers above the diagonal and for excess value 
based on assets multipliers below the diagonal. There is high correlation between variables 
Ebit_Sale, income and ROA. 
Figure 2.1 shows excess value annual averages for diversified and focused firms. 
Figure 2.2 plots the number of segments annual averages for diversified firms and shows 
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approximately the same number of segments for the samples when excess value is 
calculated with sales respectively with assets multipliers. 
To isolate the effects of the Sarbanes Oxley Act I proceed as outlined by regressions 
(1) and (2) to regress the calculated excess value (based on sales or assets) against the 
number of segments (Table 2.4) or a dummy variable for diversified firms (Table 2.6) and 
well-known control variables. In both tables I re-estimate the regressions with the dummy 
variable for SOX legislation. These fixed effects regressions are run similar to Hoechle et 
al. (2012) with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors, which are heteroskedastic-
consistent and robust to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence. Such 
an event as SOX represents an exogenous shock to the firm policy set, but I account for the 
endogeneity of the diversification decision by incorporating firm and year fixed effects in 
regressions to relieve the omitted variables bias.  
The most important outcome is a definite influence of SOX because the 
diversification discount widens and the post-SOX indicator is negative and significant. I 
expect that to happen since during the financial crisis of 2007, Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga (2010) reported a diminished diversification discount. I also see that excess 
value is positively related to growth opportunities and profitability.  
My second approach consists of cross-sectional regression of a dependent variable 
on diversification, a post-SOX indicator, the interaction between the two, along with the 
three Berger and Offek (1995) control variables and their interactions with the post-SOX 
dummy.  As before, coefficients for diversification and SOX indicators are negative 
statistically and economically significant. The coefficients on the interaction term between 
the diversification and SOX dummy are positive and significant, which translate as 
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diversification having a less negative effect on firm value after Sarbanes Oxley. As I just 
witnessed the univariate differences before and after SOX, all four multivariate regressions 
in Table 2.7 corroborate that size and profitability of corporations in the post-SOX period 
have a significant positive influence on firm value.  
The differences-in-differences approach (DD) was applied to assess the differential 
effect of the new legislation on the valuation of accelerated and non-accelerated focused 
and industrially diversified firms. Accelerated filing requirements are disclosed by 
AuditAnalytics with the variable is_accel_filer, which typically takes four values from 
2000 till 2015: blank, zero, one or two. Zero is for companies with a public float of less 
than 75 million, one for companies with a public float above 75 million, blank and two for 
companies that do not disclose their status. In order to define the treatment group of the 
DD, the new variable Div_acc is created to reflect the interaction between the Div_d 
indicator and is_accel_filer indicator (from Compustat). Table 2.9 displays no effect of 
SOX on excess valuation for accelerated filers, which confirms an overall SOX influence 
purportedly due to an all-round information asymmetry reduction for all firms. 
While the Sarbanes Oxley Act levies new requirements for firms going public 
(Johnston and Madura 2009), it does not force firms to become more diverse. In a separate 
logit estimation, I study the probability of SOX increasing the frequency of going diverse. 
Several new variables are introduced and I use all firms over the sample period from 1999 
till 2015. Major is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm is listed on NYSE, 
NASDAQ and AMEX exchanges and 0 otherwise. SP500 is an indicator variable that takes 
a value of 1 if the firm is included in the Standard and Poor’s S&P 500 index and 0 if 
otherwise. This follow-up test of hypothesis H2 shows that SOX provisions do not shed 
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any light on long-term diversification choices. To examine the robustness of the results, all 
2003 observations are included in the analysis since SOX was in fact enacted in August of 
2002.33 Moreover, a subsample of focused and diversified firms with observations only for 
2000-2002 and 2004-2006 is created. The estimation excluding geographic segments 
(results not included to conserve space) is redone.  In all cases, the SOX dummy reveals 
the same patterns and is significant at a 1% level. Similar to Berger and Offek (1995), an 
alternative definition of diversification is calculated with a revenue based-Herfindahl 
measure and an asset based-Herfindahl measure. Herfindahl index is a proxy of industry 
concentration (focus) and consistent with my prior predictions, the Herfindahl index is 
positively and significantly associated with excess value. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
My analysis offers new evidence on excess value markdown. I determined that the 
value of diversification has not changed from a discount to a premium as a result of 
legislation. Did I expect a premium in the post-SOX period or maybe a decrease in the 
diversification discount? The answer in this paper is that SOX represents an exogenous 
shock to the firm that is not interlinked with firm choices. Therefore, introducing a SOX 
indicator is not comparable to introducing governance variables as controls that would have 
brought the diversification discount down to be less negative or to shift closer to zero 
(Hoechle et al. 2012).  
                                                   
33 Exchange regulations were approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission in November 2003. 
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In fact, I show that the value of diversification increases after SOX, which is similar 
to the Kuppuswamy and Villalonga 2010-crisis inquiry. Differences in differences 
methodology shows no distinctive impact on the valuation of the accelerated category of 
firms. Moreover, SOX has no contribution to motivate firms to further diversify as the 
diversification decision is highly based on firm characteristics.   
The findings of this paper are robust to the inclusion of fiscal year 2003 in the 
estimation, to a small 2000-2006 subsample, and to different measures of diversification. 
Limitations of the study consist of neglecting the governance characteristics of each firm 
that could affect the SOX variable in different ways and could make a difference in my 
estimations. It is beyond the scope of this paper to show whether compliance costs hinders 
excess valuation or whether it is far more for complex businesses.  
In sum, the empirical results highlight overlooked aspects of firm valuation after 
enactment of SOX. From the perspective of executives and regulators, empirical evidence 
on the contribution of SOX to existing trends in corporate diversification is overdue. Future 
research should investigate potential new developments in this regard.  
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variables are defined as follows: 
Capx_Sale is the ratio of capital expenditures to sales. 
Capx_Sale_SOX is Capx_Sale multiplied by SOX_d. 
Cash flow is the sum of IB (earnings before extraordinary items) and DP 
(depreciation) divided by PPENT (net property, plant, and equipment).  
Div_d is the diversification dummy an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm 
operates in two or more segments, and 0 otherwise.  
Ebit_Sale is the ratio of EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) to sales. 
Ebit_Sale_SOX is Ebit_Sale multiplied by SOX_d.  
Her is Herfindahl index the sum of the squares of segments’ sales (respectively 
assets) to the total sales (respectively assets) of the firm.  
Income is the ratio of IB (income before extraordinary items) to sales. 
Leverage is the sum of DLC (debt in current liabilities) and DLTT (long-term debt) 
divided by AT (total assets of the firm). 
Leverage_SOX is Leverage multiplied by SOX_d. 
Log_at is the log of AT (total assets of the firm).  
Log_at_SOX is Log_at multiplied by Sox_d 
Major is a diversification dummy that equals 1 if the firm is listed on major 
exchanges Nasdaq, NYSE, or AMEX, and 0 otherwise. 
N_seg is number of segments identified based on primary SIC code. 
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SOX_d is the Sarbanes-Oxley dummy an indicator that equals 0 for fiscal years 
2002 and earlier and 1 for fiscal years 2004 and later. Initially 2003 is excluded as 
representing a period of tumultuous discussions, however later is included for robustness.  
SP500 is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm is included in the 
Standard and Poor’s S&P500 index and 0 otherwise. 
TobinQ is Tobin’s Q is the  ratio of the market value of assets divided by the 
book value of assets. The market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the 
market value of common equity (fiscal year close price times shares outstanding) less the 
sum of the book value of common equity and balance sheet deferred taxes.  
Tobin Q = lag((AT+MKVAL_CALC-CEQ-TXDB)/AT) =  
lag((AT+PRCC_F*abs(CSHO) -CEQ-TXDB)/AT). 
 
APPENDIX B: MULTIPLIER “CHOP-SHOP” METHODOLOGY OF EXCESS 
VALUE. 
HIJKLMN	OPQKM = RMST ∗ (OPQKM/RMS)X,TZT[/  \]^M__	OPQKM = ln	( OPQKMHIJKLMN	OPQKM) RMST = _MSIMaL	b	cPQKM	(_PQM_	de	P__ML_) (OPQKM/RMS)X,T = IKQLbJQbMe= IMNbPa	cPQKM	df	LℎM	LdLPQ	^PJbLPQ	NbcbNMN	Ld	_MSIMaLh_	cPQKM	(_PQM_	de	P__ML_) fde	LℎM	fd^K_MN	fbeI_	ba	_MSIMaL	b′_	baNK_Lej 
Value is calculated as market value of equity plus book value of debt.  
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All segments are based on four-digit SIC code industries. Similar to Berger of Offek 
(1995) when I calculate the multiplier I want to determine the median of at least five 
focused firms. If in a given year the number of specialized firms is less than five then I use 
a three-digit SIC code to stand for industry classification. If again in a certain year the 
number of focused firms is less than five I accept a two-digit SIC code to serve as the 
industry classification. 
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of the diversified firms in the sample that includes excess 
value calculated based on sales multipliers. 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75% 
      
Pre-SOX 
      
Excess Value -0.080 0.664 -0.590 -0.087 0.412 
Leverage 0.305 0.275 0.124 0.272 0.416 
Capx_Sale 0.075 0.130 0.023 0.040 0.073 
Ebit_Sale 0.043 0.184 0.022 0.070 0.118 
Log_assets 6.630 2.076 5.098 6.492 8.103 
      
Post-SOX 
      
Excess Value -0.148 0.639 -0.638 -0.172 0.300 
Leverage 0.251 0.248 0.079 0.220 0.351 
Capx_Sale 0.072 0.127 0.020 0.036 0.069 
Ebit_Sale 0.090 0.138 0.042 0.090 0.149 
Log_Assets 7.337 2.122 5.868 7.400 8.849 
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Table 2.2: Changes in mean excess value and control variables pre- and post- SOX 
UNIVARIATE STATISTICS 
  Pre_SOX Post-SOX Difference in Mean 
    
Assets N=3110 N=5904  
Excess Value 0.041 0.011 -0.03** 
Leverage 0.307 0.257 -0.05*** 
Capx_Sale 0.073 0.074 0.001 
Ebit_Sale 0.048 0.083 0.035*** 
Log_at 6.563 7.325 0.762*** 
    
Sales N=3337 N=6663  
Excess Value -0.080 -0.148 -0.068*** 
Leverage 0.305 0.251 -0.054*** 
Capx_Sale 0.075 0.072 -0.003 
Ebit_Sale 0.043 0.090 0.047*** 
Log_at 6.630 7.337 0.707*** 
. The parametric t-test was conducted pooled and Satterthwaite method. *, **, *** indicates significance 
at less than 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
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Table 2.3: Pearson correlations between the variables for the sample 
Pearson Correlations 
 N_seg Div_d Leverage Ebit_Sale Capx_Sale Log_at Major SP500 Income Cashflow TobinQ 
N_seg 1.00 0.75 -0.06 0.04 -0.09 0.39 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.04 -0.01 
Div_d 0.79 1.00 -0.08 0.02 -0.12 0.29 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.05 -0.01 
Leverage 0.003 0.003 1.00 0.06 0.11 0.11 -0.21 -0.07 -0.03 -0.13 0.06 
Ebit_Sale 0.07 0.07 0.08 1.00 -0.01 0.26 0.13 -0.04 0.64 0.12 0.08 
Capx_Sale -0.10 -0.13 0.11 -0.07 1.00 0.08 0.02 -0.13 -0.08 -0.003 -0.06 
Log_at 0.40 0.30 0.12 0.24 0.09 1.00 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.03 -0.11 
Major 0.14 0.17 -0.16 0.10 0.03 0.21 1.00 0.24 0.04 0.06 -0.02 
SP500 0.17 0.20 -0.01 -0.04 -0.13 0.13 0.19 1.00 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
Income 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.55 -0.11 0.10 0.01 0.03 1.00 0.19 0.00 
Cashflow 0.05 0.06 -0.002 0.17 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.09 1.00 -0.24 
TobinQ -0.06 -0.07 0.04 -0.14 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 1.00 
This table reports Pearson correlations between the variables for the sample with excess value calculated with sales multipliers above the diagonal 
and for excess value based on assets multipliers below the diagonal. There is high correlation between variables Ebit_Sale, income and ROA.
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Table 2.4: Fixed effects regression of excess value on number of segments, post-SOX 
indicator and control variables for focused and diversified firms (1999-2015) 
FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
  Excess Value 
 Sales Assets 
     
N_seg -0.046 -0.063 -0.016 -0.019 
 (8.32)*** (11.04)*** (2.18)** (2.04)** 
SOX_d  -0.227  -0.064 
  (11.50)***  (3.75)*** 
Leverage -0.034 -0.098 0.033 0.022 
 (0.96) (2.86)* (0.96) (0.88) 
Ebit_Sale 0.122 0.126 0.256 0.244 
 (2.63)*** (2.65)*** (6.82)*** (6.87)*** 
Capx_Sale 0.399 0.354 0.128 0.113 
 (11.29)*** (14.53)*** (3.05)*** (3.04)*** 
Log_at 0.037 0.107 -0.086 -0.068 
 (2.71)*** (6.05)*** (5.87)*** (3.02)*** 
Year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 
(within) 0.014 0.044 0.020 0.022 
Nr. of firms 4102 4073 3761 3730 
Nr. of 
observations 16,194 15,218 15,299 14,348 
The sample includes all focused and diversified firms downloaded from Compustat Historical 
Segments database during the 2000 through 2015 period. The dependent variable is firm excess value 
measured based on sales, respectively based on assets. All independent variables are defined in Appendix A 
and the continuous ones are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. t-Statistics in parentheses are based on Driscoll 
and Kraay(1998) standard errors (heteroskedastic-consistent and robust to general forms of cross-sectional 
and temporal dependence). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level. 
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Table 2.5: Fixed effects regression of excess value on number of segments, post-SOX 
indicator and control variables only for diversified firms (1999-2015) 
FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
  Excess Value 
 Sales Assets 
   
N_seg -0.053 -0.031 
 (12.36)*** (3.06)*** 
SOX_d -0.221 -0.053 
 (12.08)*** (3.73)*** 
Leverage -0.019 -0.007 
 (0.26) (0.12) 
Ebit_Sale 0.563 0.675 
 (6.89)*** (5.64)*** 
Capx_Sale 0.504 0.340 
 (8.32)*** (3.58)*** 
Log_at 0.121 -0.072 
 (5.39)*** (3.17)*** 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.05 0.038 
Nr. of firms 2389 2043 
Nr. of observations 9,138 8,207 
 The sample includes all diversified firms downloaded from Compustat Historical Segments 
database during the 2000 through 2015 period. The dependent variable is firm excess value measured based 
on sales, respectively based on assets. All independent variables are defined in Appendix A and the 
continuous ones are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. t-Statistics in parentheses are based on Driscoll and 
Kraay(1998) standard errors (heteroskedastic-consistent and robust to general forms of cross-sectional and 
temporal dependence). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level. 
  
 84 
Table 2.6: Fixed effects regression of excess value on diversification and post-SOX 
indicator and control variables for focused and diversified firms (1999-2015) 
FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
  Excess Value 
 Sales Assets 
     
Div_d -0.088 -0.109 0.023 0.017 
 (3.41)*** (3.70)*** (1.28) (0.84) 
SOX_d  -0.221  -0.061 
  (12.04)***  (3.57)*** 
Leverage -0.034 -0.098 0.029 0.02 
 (0.98) (2.87)*** (0.83) (0.77) 
Ebit_Sale 0.123 0.128 0.258 0.249 
 (2.66)*** (2.70)*** (6.89)*** (6.93)*** 
Capx_Sale 0.398 0.354 0.129 0.116 
 (11.47)*** (14.71)*** (3.05)*** (3.02)*** 
Log_at 0.036 0.103 -0.088 -0.07 
 (2.65)*** (5.93)*** (5.69)*** (3.21)*** 
Year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 
(within) 0.014 0.042 0.019 0.022 
Nr. of firms 4102 4073 3779 3748 
Nr. of 
observations 16,194 15,219 15339 14386 
The sample includes all focused and diversified firms downloaded from Compustat Historical 
Segments database during the 2000 through 2015 period. The dependent variable is firm excess value 
measured based on sales, respectively based on assets. All independent variables are defined in Appendix A 
and the continuous ones are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. t-Statistics in parentheses are based on Driscoll 
and Kraay(1998) standard errors (heteroskedastic-consistent and robust to general forms of cross-sectional 
and temporal dependence). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.  
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Table 2.7: Fixed effects regression of excess value on diversification indicator, post-SOX 
indicator, control variables, and their interactions with the SOX dummy for focused and 
diversified firms (1999-2015) 
FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
  Excess Value 
 Sales Assets 
     
Div_d -0.171  -0.041  
 (6.29)***  (2.38)**  
DivSOX_d 0.084  0.081  
 (5.50)***  (4.82)***  
N_seg  -0.084  -0.041 
  (15.11)***  (5.34)*** 
N_segSOX_d  0.028  0.031 
  (6.81)***  (5.65)*** 
SOX_d -0.108 -0.092 0.064 0.066 
 (3.74)*** (3.64)*** (1.62) (1.71)* 
Leverage -0.021 -0.020 0.073 0.075 
 (0.36) (0.33) (1.78)* (1.92)* 
Leverage_SOX -0.096 -0.097 -0.055 -0.053 
 (2.01)** (2.06)** (0.90) (0.90) 
Ebit_Sale 0.002 -0.001 0.131 0.120 
 (0.03) (0.02) (1.59) (1.48) 
Ebit_Sale_SOX 0.222 0.224 0.218 0.230 
 (5.65)*** (5.62)*** (2.91)*** (3.20)*** 
Capx_Sale 0.240 0.242 0.099 0.095 
 (2.93)*** (2.93)*** (1.50) (1.45) 
Capx_Sale_SOX 0.126 0.123 -0.004 -0.002 
 (1.24) (1.21) (0.08) (0.04) 
Log_at 0.121 0.128 -0.052 -0.046 
 (7.49)*** (7.84)*** (2.71)*** (2.36)** 
Log_at_SOX -0.026 -0.030 -0.027 -0.030 
 (7.10)*** (7.87)*** (8.33)*** (9.04)*** 
The sample includes all focused and diversified firms downloaded from Compustat Historical 
Segments database during the 2000 through 2015 period. The dependent variable is firm excess value 
measured based on sales, respectively based on assets. All independent variables are defined in Appendix A 
and the continuous ones are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. t-Statistics in parentheses are based on Driscoll 
and Kraay(1998) standard errors (heteroskedastic-consistent and robust to general forms of cross-sectional 
and temporal dependence). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level. 
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Table 2.7: Continued 
FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 
(within) 0.046 0.048 0.027 0.027 
Nr. of firms 4073 4073 3748 3730 
Nr. of 
observations 15,218 15,218 14,386 14,348 
The sample includes all focused and diversified firms downloaded from Compustat Historical 
Segments database during the 2000 through 2015 period. The dependent variable is firm excess value 
measured based on sales, respectively based on assets. All independent variables are defined in Appendix A 
and the continuous ones are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. t-Statistics in parentheses are based on Driscoll 
and Kraay(1998) standard errors (heteroskedastic-consistent and robust to general forms of cross-sectional 
and temporal dependence). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level. 
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Table 2.8: Difference-in-differences (DD) analysis comparing diversified firms with 
accelerated filer status before and after SOX 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS 
Excess Value (measured based on Sales) 
     
Div_d -0.080 -0.068   
 (2.90)** (1.52)   
N_seg   -0.068 -0.066 
   (9.79)*** (7.77)*** 
SOX_d -0.207 -0.207 -0.214 -0.213 
 (6.43)*** (6.45)*** (6.76)*** (6.67)*** 
SOX_ACC 0.007 0.018 0.008 0.015 
 (0.22) (0.38) (0.27) (0.42) 
Div_d_SOX_ACC  -0.016   
  (0.45)   
N_seg_SOX_ACC    -0.003 
    (0.24) 
Leverage -0.104 -0.104 -0.101 -0.101 
 (5.31)*** (5.23)*** (5.20)** (5.10)** 
Ebit_Sale 0.129 0.129 0.126 0.126 
 (2.64)** (2.64)** (2.62)* (2.62)* 
Capx_Sale 0.358 0.358 0.356 0.356 
 (11.76)*** (11.75)*** (11.89)** (11.88)** 
Log_at 0.065 0.065 0.067 0.067 
 (3.18)** (3.17)** (3.34)** (3.30)** 
R-squared (within) 0.027 0.027 0.03 0.03 
Nr. of firms 2579 2579 2579 2579 
Nr. of observations 9,892 9,892 9,892 9,892 
The dependent variable is firm excess value measured based on sales. SOX_ACC is the indicator 
identifying how the treatment started. The insignificant coefficient for Div_d_SOX_ACC respectively for 
N_SEG_SOX_ACC is the difference-in-differences estimator. The other independent variables are defined 
in Appendix A and the continuous ones are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. %. t-Statistics in parentheses 
are based on Driscoll and Kraay(1998) standard errors (heteroskedastic-consistent and robust to general 
forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 level. 
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Table 2.9: Robustness test of Table 2.4 - SOX indicator takes the value of one on and 
after 2003 
ROBUSTNESS TEST 
  Excess Value 
 Sales Assets 
     
N_seg -0.062  -0.023  
 (13.87)***  (2.90)***  
Div_d  -0.106  0.016 
  (3.80)***  (0.84) 
SOX_d -0.203 -0.197 -0.068 -0.064 
 (7.59)*** (7.82)*** (4.82)*** (4.50)*** 
Leverage -0.080 -0.080 0.015 0.013 
 (2.06)** (2.09)** (0.49) (0.39) 
Ebit_Sale 0.140 0.142 0.261 0.263 
 (3.17)*** (3.22)*** (6.73)*** (6.81)*** 
Capx_Sale 0.357 0.357 0.117 0.119 
 (16.35)*** (16.56)*** (3.23)*** (3.22)*** 
Log_at 0.094 0.091 -0.067 -0.070 
 (4.98)*** (4.89)*** (3.32)*** (3.51)*** 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.04 0.039 0.024 0.022 
Nr. of firms 4102 4102 3761 3779 
Nr. of observations 16,194 16,194 15,299 15,339 
The sample includes all focused and diversified firms downloaded from Compustat Historical 
Segments database during the 2000 through 2015 period. The dependent variable is firm excess value 
measured based on sales, respectively based on assets. All independent variables are defined in Appendix A 
and the continuous ones are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. t-Statistics in parentheses are based on Driscoll 
and Kraay(1998) standard errors (heteroskedastic-consistent and robust to general forms of cross-sectional 
and temporal dependence). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level. 
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Table 2.10: Robustness test - fixed effects regression of excess value on Herfindahl 
index, post-SOX indicator, and control variables for focused and diversified companies 
(1999-2015). 
ROBUSTNESS TEST 
 Excess Value 
 Sales Assets 
   
Her_index 7.035 6.492 0.453 0.455 
 (14.23)*** (9.39)*** (3.45)*** (3.51)*** 
SOX_d  -0.212  -0.063 
  (11.45)***  (3.72)*** 
Leverage -0.032 -0.096 0.032 0.022 
 (0.87) (2.66)*** (0.87) (0.79) 
Ebit_Sale 0.201 0.200 0.256 0.248 
 (4.47)*** (4.27)*** (6.79)*** (6.79)*** 
Capx_Sale 0.381 0.339 0.129 0.116 
 (10.32)*** (12.91)*** (3.07)*** (3.03)*** 
Log_at 0.069 0.130 -0.080 -0.062 
 (4.48)*** (7.93)*** (5.16)*** (2.76)*** 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.019 0.046 0.022 0.026 
Nr. of firms 4102 4073 3779 3748 
Nr. of observations 16,194 15,218 15,339 14,386 
 The sample includes all focused and diversified firms downloaded from Compustat Historical 
Segments database during the 2000 through 2015 period. The dependent variable is firm excess value 
measured based on sales, respectively based on assets. All independent variables are defined in Appendix A 
and the continuous ones are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. t-Statistics in parentheses are based on Driscoll 
and Kraay(1998) standard errors (heteroskedastic-consistent and robust to general forms of cross-sectional 
and temporal dependence). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level. 
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Table 2.11: The effect of SOX on the probability to diversify estimated by a logit analysis 
Logistic Regression 
  Div_d 
 Sales Assets 
     
SOX_d 0.208 0.205 0.224 0.221 
 (1.56) (1.53) (1.59) (1.56) 
Leverage -0.313*** -0.284*** -0.226*** -0.180** 
 (-3.81) (-3.45) (-2.63) (-2.09) 
Capx_sale -1.859*** -1.840*** -1.749*** -1.750*** 
 (-16.24) (-16.06) (-14.31) (-14.28) 
Ebit_Sale 0.339***  0.548***  
 (3.95)  (6.81)  
Income  0.157***  0.168* 
  (2.91)  (1.86) 
Log_at 0.333*** 0.338*** 0.355*** 0.365*** 
 (32.23) (32.97) (32.96) (33.39) 
Major -0.004 0.003 -0.034 -0.018 
 (-0.07) (0.07) (-0.63) (-0.33) 
SP500 0.741*** 0.737*** 0.972*** 0.965*** 
 (13.32) (13.26) (16.43) (16.35) 
Cashflow -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (-3.16) (-3.24) (-3.59) (-3.12) 
TobinQ -0.183*** -0.181*** -0.307*** -0.309*** 
 (-10.21) (-10.19) (-13.60) (-14.08) 
Pseudo R2 0.122 0.122 0.149 0.148 
N 14771 14771 13943 13943 
The sample includes all focused and diversified firms downloaded from Compustat Historical 
Segments database during the 2000 through 2015 period.  The dependent variable is the diversification 
indicator which takes values of 1 if firm operates in multiple industry segments and 0 otherwise. All 
independent variables are defined in Appendix A and the continuous ones are winsorized at top and bottom 
1%. The estimation method is maximum likelihood and the regression includes a constant term and year 
dummies (not reported). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level. 
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Figure 2.1: Excess value annual averages for diversified and focused companies 
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Figure 2.2: Number of segments annual averages for diversified companies for the two 
samples when  excess value is calculated based on sales respectively based on assets 
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CHAPTER 3 DETERMINANTS OF GLOBALIZATION 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
What reflects the strategic intent to establish sales in foreign markets? Denis et al. 
(2002) says solid reasons for firms to diversify internationally include putting a company’s 
strengths – such as production or marketing – to work in competitively conducive 
environments and increasing firms’ operating flexibility. I attempt to find out why some 
companies conduct experiments, believing that they can do better in other countries than 
local firms in that country can do, while other companies never attempt to move some of 
their operations abroad. Ignoring the desire of investors to hold a globally diversified 
portfolio by such means, I look inside the black box of reasons for undertaking the decision 
for global diversification. My analysis is conducted from the point of view of two different 
selections of firms that coexist within the breadth and variety of the US market. First, born-
global companies (BGs) from their inception do not hesitate to exploit their opportunities 
in other countries. In general, according to Marinelli (2011), firms start their global 
diversification path by importing and exporting, progressively increasing their 
internationalization. 34 
In that respect, the US IPOs represent a junior-grade replica of born-global 
companies with exclusive qualifications, and the first part of my study places emphasis on 
the decision of the initial owners and investors to maximize the outcome of their ventures. 
                                                   
34 Some authors argue that the development of exports does not suffice for a firm’s inclusion among global 
diversified enterprises.  
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Second, at totally different points of their growth cycle are “born-again” global companies 
(BaGs). These are mature, accomplished firms that experience globalization after they 
already possess various expertise and resources.35 To precisely analyze the determinants of 
globalization, how the firms mentioned above are different ex-ante from those that are not 
engaged in international activities, my extensive data set includes domestically focused 
IPOs and mature corporations. 
The various theoretical underpinnings for my research range from developing 
conventional wisdom of firm characteristics and prominent agency views to those about 
the need for innovation and the market signaling valuable information to businesses. 
Matsusaka and Nanda (2002) build up a model of organization based on advantages 
and expenses, showing that, depending upon a firm’s characteristics, diversification can be 
efficient or wasteful. Furthermore, Matsusaka (2001) says that corporate diversification is 
a search process centered on a firm’s organizational capabilities. The firm hunts for a good 
match for its organizational skills, but its search is in fact pure experimentation. It can come 
along these lines as vital and valuable for the ﬁrm to explore different avenues regarding 
new lines of business to determine whether its particular resources or general resources 
determine their success. To establish the similarity between industrial and multinational 
diversification, I revisit the traditional perspective of corporate strategy on which a firm is 
expected to focus when juvenile. Therefore, it is straightforward to think that born-global 
firms ought to have—and in fact probably do have—specific resources in addition to 
general resources, all of which must be easily accessible if failure is to be prevented 
                                                   
35 Born-again global firms (BaG) accelerate their internationalization after they are already accomplished in 
their home markets (see Bell et al. 2001, 2003). 
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(Bernardo and Chowdhry 2002). Born-again globals (BaGs) attempting to globalize at a 
later phase should categorically be endowed with more financial resources than their 
unseasoned peers. 
While domestic firms rely solely on internal capital markets, the accessibility of 
global markets is evidence that diversified firms take this course as a way to boost their 
growth opportunities. Based on past empirical evidence, it is unlikely that, ceteris paribus, 
superior ability is followed by deficiency with respect to growth opportunities after 
globalization. I explore this hypothesis when I have three consecutive years of 
diversification and find, as expected, a strong negative relation between growth and 
internationalization for each of the three samples of BGs as well as for the BaGs. 
Furthermore, I inquire whether peer effects could be an important determinant of 
the decision to successfully internationalize. Peer firms assume a central role in many 
economic perspectives, including corporate policies and capital structure (Leary and 
Roberts 2014). In the context, Miller (2006) hypothesizes that an industry-leading firm 
may use its advanced resources to broaden its operations into foreign markets. 
Consequently, it is conspicuous to presume that all firms unsure about future global 
strategies can follow the behavior of their competitors, especially those that are large and 
mature. Inspired by the excess value measure of Lamont and Polk (2002) and other similar 
measures I define a peer influence measure as the ratio of all firms in the industry that are 
globally diversified. The benefit of this new measure is illustrated by findings for both BGs 
and BAGs (young and small as well as large and mature companies).  
In terms of market signaling when firms are in a strong competitive position with 
respect to their rivals, they may choose to globally diversify in order to complement their 
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domestic opportunities. Under this null hypothesis firms diversify because they adopt 
innovation that their peers abroad do not pursue. I thus measure internal innovation with 
the help of patents and citations. Trajtenberg (1990) and Griliches (1990) have found 
patents and citations to be reliable proxies of research productivity. I find that the number 
of patents possessed and number of citations received are positive influencers of global 
diversification. 
All of the determinants mentioned above do not imply that the private interests of 
managers do not meddle in diversification. If there are private interests, the diversified 
firms are associated with a valuation discount because diversification is not the ideal 
strategy when it diminishes shareholders wealth. To the degree that cash flows from 
worldwide segments are imperfectly correlated managers own private portfolios are safer.  
I directly test whether CEO ownership and firms’ idiosyncratic risk are negative 
determinants of global diversification. I corroborate that, if the ownership share of a firm’s 
management is high, the manager’s private costs surpass his private benefits, and therefore 
I see a wary propensity to go global. 
My study extends the prior literature in no less than three ways. First, my study can 
be considered as a stepping stone for future research because it corroborates prior findings 
uncovered by empirical work into industrial diversification. Second, as international 
entrepreneurship research has called for more exploration regarding the initial impact of 
born globals, I study ongoing commitment to foreign markets in the public company’s first 
three years of life. Third, to the best of my knowledge, the sundry nature of the decision to 
diversify has not been compared across recently publicly traded companies and their older 
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counterparts. My tests not only are designed to detect which diversification hypothesis is 
fortified by the data, but are also planned to detect distinctions between BGs and BaGs. 
 
3.2. Literature review 
While the tendency to operate domestically is easy to understand the preceding 
research (Hyland and Diltz, 2002, Colak 2010) is keen to find the causes of diversification. 
As a market-value increase is the optimal outcome of diversification, I discuss in this 
section factors that affect either geographic or industrial diversification. Note that these 
factors do not need to be mutually exclusive and I formulate my hypotheses separately for 
each scenario.  
The first factors that prevail among the industrially diversifying determinants are 
related to a firm’s industry involvement and economic outlook. Colak (2010) calls them 
“outside factors” because he incorporates the firm’s exchange, index inclusion, and other 
general economic conditions. Indeed, Colak (2010) reports evidence of separate drivers 
leading the refocusing and diversification propensities. For instance, all firm characteristics 
have a far from negligible influence on refocusing decisions, with size and age raising the 
likelihood of refocusing actions and profitability, investment, research and development 
(R&D) spending, and growth rates having a negative influence. Campa and Kedia (2002) 
corroborate these findings; they control for the endogeneity of the diversification decision 
and estimate a probit model. They find that firm and industry characteristics tend not to be 
highly significant in explaining the diversification choice. 
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Since my samples of firms are enigmatic, similar but dissimilar on the account of a 
short and long time lag between the first public offering and the beginning of firm’s 
international operations I propose 
H1: Firm characteristics of global and domestic firms are comparable. 
The second issue is the claim that Hyland and Diltz (2002) and Stowe and Xing 
(2006) advance that diversification is associated ex-ante with fewer growth opportunities. 
Stowe and Xing (2006) suggest that differing growth opportunities between diversified and 
single-segment firms cannot account for the value destruction of the diversified firms. 
Indeed, comparing the growth opportunity means (and medians) of diversified and single-
segment firms, Stowe and Xing (2006) document significant values of 0.0733 (0.0493) and 
0.0815 (0.0586). In the year before diversification, Hyland and Diltz (2002) find lower 
median sales growth of diversified firms.36 That is precisely why firms expand in multi-
segment businesses: because of poor growth opportunities in their current activities, they 
diversify to contract new expansion and growth. This line of thinking is related to 
Matsusaka (2001), who suggests that the decline in status quo (e.g., drop in current sales) 
results in the firm searching for more profits. A firm’s poor performance owing to a 
mismatch in the organizational capabilities of its existing businesses causes the 
diversification discount and not the other way around with the diversification inducing the 
diversification discount.  
                                                   
36 Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find that organizations with higher growth opportunities are more 
likely to take part in spin-offs.  
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I label formulate this hypothesis as growth or magnification hypothesis follows:  
H2: Firms diversify simply because they want to grow (BGs) or they want to 
continue to grow (BaGs).  
	
Fundamentally, information-based or knowledge-based assets should empower the 
firm to embark in exploration of foreign markets. However, the empirical results are mixed. 
According to Miller (2006) increased diversification leads to more technological diversity, 
and more prominent knowledge-based assets will encourage the firm to further expand. On 
the other hand, Gao and Chou (2015) show that multinational firms innovate less efficiently 
than do their domestic counterparts.37 
Following the same line of thinking, Alonso-Borrego and Forcadell (2010) show a 
positive linear effect of investment in intangible assets, R&D intensity, on related 
diversification. However, it is possible that in order to create value for their shareholders, 
diversified firms may significantly lower their research and development expenditure 
levels. My interest lies in testing whether firms that possess ultra technological diversity 
are more prone to launch into foreign markets; therefore, I posit my innovation 
sophistication hypothesis as follows: 
H3: Firms that generate a higher number of patents, citations, or R&D 
intensity, are more likely to diversify globally	
                                                   
37 Seru (2014) measures innovation with patent-based metrics and finds that firms acquired in diversifying 
mergers have lower levels of innovation and even less creative innovation  
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Other theoretical frameworks that can affect diversification are institutional factors 
like ownership and control concerns, described as power-grabbing behavior.38 These 
theoretical frameworks are supported by evidence introduced by Aggarwal and Samwick 
(2003) and Denis et al. (1997) in the context of agency explanation and firm valuation. 
Managerial self-interest (Click and Harrison 2000) is at odds with the firm’s efforts to 
reduce the extent of its diversification or even failing to take advantage of multinational 
opportunities altogether. Controversy can result from this hypothesis unless supported by 
thorough empirical findings (May 1995, Denis et al. 1997). Denis et al. (1997) investigate 
it using five different measures: (1) the fraction of firms with multiple segments, (2) the 
number of segments reported by management, (3) the number of 4-digit SIC codes assigned 
to the firm by COMPUSTAT, (4) a revenue-based Herfindahl index, and (5) an asset-based 
Herfindahl index. 
Ownership by insiders is inversely related to corporate diversification, and the 
interpretation that self-benefitting functions are offset by higher ownership stakes is 
fruitful. For that reason, I posit that managers who have low ownership stakes engage their 
enterprises in foreign activities.  
H4: Corporate focus is positively related to CEO ownership.  
Management views the advantages of diversification sometimes through the lens of 
idiosyncratic risk minimization. This idea is a popular one (Amihud and Lev 1981, May 
1995, Mansi and Reeb 2002, Aggarwal and Samwick 2003): managers pursue 
                                                   
38 Duchin and Sosyura (2013) discuss the favoritism hypothesis, which predicts that favorable treatment will 
be granted to divisional managers connected to the CEO by close personal relationship. As a result of 
allocating capital to divisions whose managers have a good rapport with the company’s CEO, the firm limits 
its forthcoming investment efficiency.  
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diversification as a result of their personal risk reduction preferences. The “managerialism” 
findings by Amihud and Lev (1981) emphasize that the risks associated with firms’ 
performance are also hazards for CEOs. They show that since CEOs’ compensation is tied 
to firms’ accomplishments, CEOs display a higher interest in conglomerate mergers. May 
(1995) proposes that managers with more human capital vested in the firm display a higher 
affinity for risk reduction. May (1995) proxies the CEO human capital vested in the firm 
by tenure (number of years spent at that firm) and reports that CEOs who have been 
employed for many years have a greater tendency to diversify. A more recent paper, 
Aggarwal and Samwick (2003), considers three situations: when the manager claims 
private benefits only, when the manager has risk reduction benefits only, and when 
the manager has both private benefits and risk reduction benefits. The comparative 
static equilibrium model of Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) does not encourage the second 
premise, diversification ex-post in order to diminish firm’s ex-ante idiosyncratic risk. 
Taking into consideration these prior tests, I formalize my unsystematic risk hypothesis as 
follows: 
H5: As the idiosyncratic risk of the firm increases, the degree of 
diversification will rise. 
 
3.3. Samples and Methodology 
I collect information on initial public offerings (IPOs) issued in 1992-2009 from 
the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC’s) New Issues database. I stop the data collection 
in 2009 due to missing information with respect to the number of patents owned by the 
firms after that year.  
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When studying born-global (BG) and born-again-global (BaG) attitudes toward 
diversifying abroad, I examine time sequences of events that occur at specific points in 
time. The sequence of events that I consider is four years of consecutive foreign pre-tax 
income gains. I undertake this tactic for several reasons. First, I look to apply more 
distinctive methodologies than the extant studies to determine the real causes of global 
diversification. Second, foreign sales are a widely used measure of global diversification; 
therefore, it is ideal to adopt that measure. Third, prior research has determined the degree 
of internalization of the research samples based on 5 percent (Zahra et al., 2000), 10 percent 
(McDougall, 1989), or 25 percent (Knight and Cavusgil, 2004) criteria (i.e., if a firm has 
obtained at least 5, 10, or 25 percent of its sales from foreign markets). Although looking 
for exemplary firms, these authors do not differentiate between foreign and export sales. I 
proceed in the direction mentioned above without an arbitrary cutoff because I target only 
firms’ foreign sales and 10 percent or 25 percent of total income is too high for newly 
issued firms, which may even report negative foreign pre-tax income. In doing so, I capture 
a broader pool of businesses; however, this approach is not as lenient as one would think. 
Since I look at four continuous years of global diversification commitment, no restriction 
is effective because otherwise the size of my sample would suffer a huge diminishing effect 
due to discontinuity. 
The first exercise is to create subsamples of firms that diversify or stay domestic. 
The origin of the globalization events is easy to pinpoint in case of BGs based on issue 
date. However, the situation is not the same for BaGs, for which the progression of 
international interest has no point of reference. Figure 3.1 describes enterprises that 
diversify beginning with their IPO year. The maximum time lag between the year the firm 
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goes public and the subsequent globalization decision is three years, consistent with Knight 
and Cavusgil (2004) rapid internationalization theory.  
To preserve the standards of the recent research I exclude regulated industries (SIC 
4900-4999) and financial services (SIC 6000-6900)  
I measure diversification by a dummy, Div, which equals one if the firm reports 
pre-tax foreign income during the fiscal year. I follow Lang and Stulz (1994) and Stowe 
and Xing (2006) to calculate growth opportunities as the ratio of capital expenditures to 
total assets. I take after Morck and Yeung (1991) and apply research and development 
spending per total assets.39 
I download the patent and citations data from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) patent database. The most up-to-date version of the NBER data offers 
comprehensive information on all patents granted by U.S. Patent and Trademark Office till 
2009 which in fact fits my samples’ definition. I match the NBER patent database to 
Compustat using GVKEY and CUSIP identifiers (see Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001). 
I calculate number of patents as patent counts for a firm each year (grant year) and I 
compute number of citations as citation counts that a firm received for its patents that year 
(grant year). I set the number of patents or citations to zero for those firm-years for which 
there is no information available.  
The peer influence (PIND) is calculated based on inspiration from Campa and 
Kedia (2002) who calculate PNDIV the fraction of all firms in the industry that are 
                                                   
39 Research and development spending per total assets proxy for production and marketing in Morck and 
Yeung (1998) and geographic diversification adds to shareholders value only in the presence of these R&D 
related assets. 
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conglomerates. PIND is the fraction of all firms in the industry that are globally diversified 
(in other words have a non blank Compustat pifo variable). The PIND measure is based on 
two-digit SIC codes, results are consistent when I re-do the estimations for three-digit SIC 
codes. The other variables are depicted more fully in the appendix. 
The last sample that I construct and I refer to it as BG M consists of all IPOs for 
which data is available having one year, two years, three years, four years or none of global 
diversification during the first four year of existence as a public company. The name BG 
M suggest the methodological approach, BG M helps us analyze the changes in 
diversification refocusing status by applying a multinomial logit model.  The multinomial 
logit model estimates the probability of a firm choosing from among five different 
scenarios in four years: 4N, 4D, 3D1N, 2D2N, or 1D3N where N represents a domestic 
profile and D represents the diversification route. I are not interested in possible 
permutations but rather the final count in these first four years, which means I do not 
enforce the previously mentioned consecutive rule and there are only five choices for an 
IPO. I cannot conduct the same analysis for BaG companies simply because I lack the 
reference points. However, I hope that the factors that determine a firm’s evolution in the 
post-public phase shed plenty of light on global diversification decisions, previously 
considered by many to be purely human-judgment decisions.  
 
3.4. Empirical Evidence 
I have in my first BG sample (BG 14) factoring years 1 through 4 after initial public 
offering 48 firms, in my second BG sample (BG 25) covering years 2 through 5 after IPO 
1,262 firms, and in my third BG sample (BG 36) addressing years 3 through 6 after 
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inception 112 firms. The born again sample (BaG) covering mature firms that diversify 
after at least ten years after their inception is comprised of 315 firms. Out of 48 firms in 
the first sample 15 firms manifest ongoing diversification for four years, which represents 
31%. Out of 1,262 firms, 231 firms display prolonged diversification for four years, which 
reflects 18.3%. Out of 112 total firms, 23 have steady global involvement for four years, 
which represents 20.5%.  
The fourth column of Table 3.1 shows the number of industrially diversified 
conglomerates in these four samples. There are notable differences in column five of Table 
3.1 in regards to prior international involvement. The column shows that almost all born 
globals try to discover what the globalization is really like before they become very 
involved in it. On the other hand, the mature companies in the BaG sample, firms with 
experience of at least ten years, do not seem to need predictive approaches as only a few 
of them have prior global experience in the last four years. 
Figure 3.1 compares the annual number of firms that internationalize in each of my 
samples for the 1992-2009 period. Based on this graph, I should always concentrate my 
attention to empirics for sample BG 25 and sample BaG, considering the other two samples 
only additionally since some years have a sparse number of firms.  
I list the distribution of focused and global diversified firms according to the 38 
Fama and French industry classification in Table 3.2. This represents verification that there 
are no distributions of companies in the utilities and financial services industries. To give 
a sense of the differences in the born global and born again global samples I look at the 
ratio of pre-tax foreign income to total pre-tax income, assets, sales and total value. Such 
differences have been previously documented in the literature for firms at different points 
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in their lifecycle (Fort et al., 2013) and I see significant variations among BG and BaG 
samples. For positive ratios of pre-tax foreign income to total pre-tax income the 
percentages range from less than 1 to over 280 percent of total operations. 
Further, I report descriptive statistics (minimum, maximum, mean, median, 
standard deviation) for all variables included in the regression models of the born global 
sample (BG 25) later. The left panel of Table 3.4 reports statistics for 1,031 domestic firms 
with no international involvement and the right panel for 231 internationalized firms as 
characteristics vary across different diversification profiles. To save space I report in Table 
3.5 cross-correlations for the entire sample (BG 25). My PIND measure defined for both 
domestic and multinational firms is negatively correlated with my measure of 
diversification.  
At the heart of the analysis are the hypotheses about growth opportunities and peer 
influence. Evidence presented in the first and second columns of Tables 3.7, 3.11 and 3.12 
show that in samples (BG 25) and (BaG) firms globally diversify in order to grow. This 
significant and negative influence of growth opportunities on the probability of 
diversification suggests that firms with less growth opportunities welcome 
internationalization, but firms with more growth opportunities are less enthusiastic to 
internationalize. I see that the relation is robust to industry fixed effects estimation for 
(BaGs), but not for (BG 25) with industry fixed effects specified by four digit SIC codes.40 
If the firm is looking for international rent-seeking activities, it is very likely that it 
will be strongly subjected to the influence of its industry peers as the firm assesses whether 
                                                   
40 Santalo and Bercera (2008) demonstrate that diversified firms perform better in certain industries. 
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global activities are in fact better opportunities. All the samples supply clear evidence that 
peer industry influence plays a large role in diversification. The variable PIND is 
significantly and negatively related to global diversification for BGs but significantly and 
positively identified with diversification for BAGs.  
It seems that born globals are deterred from pursuing global diversification when 
their industry peers display much experience in that regard (columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Tables 
3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10). The intuition behind the results is that born globals may 
consider globalization a messy strategy because their domestic opportunities are 
comparatively better. Being young and having many uncertainties, they view the signal 
they receive from their industry peers as competitive, and they stay away, preferring to 
reap the benefits of the domestic market. 
The explanation for positive and significant coefficients in columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 of 
Tables 3. 11 and 3.12 has its roots in the “resource-based view” of the firm. As BaGs have 
many more resources than BGs, their primary reason for following their peers is that they 
have more trust in their own resources and capabilities. They do not view their industry 
peers as competing, which will prevent them from globally diversifying; on the contrary, 
they view them as leading in that direction. I should not forget that in industrial 
diversification literature, when firms refocus because of diminished performance, their 
managers declare that they “did not belong in that business.” Similarly, in the global 
diversification realm, it is very hard to say ex ante that diversification is the right decision; 
rather, firms need external influence to reassure them. 
Further, Tables 3.13, 3.14 and 3.15 showcase hypothesis H3 that companies with 
higher levels of innovation have higher propensities to reap the benefits of global 
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diversification. Coefficients on L_N_patents L_N_citations, and L_Rd are positive and 
significant supporting the intuition that a diversification decision is strongly driven by a 
firm’s innovation intensity (patents, citations and R&D expertise). The results remain 
robust with the interpretation being exactly the same when I control for industry-level 
unobserved factors (regressions not reported to preserve space).  
Due to data availability limitations I am able to analyze only a born global (BG 25) 
sample. Tables 3.16 and 3.17 test hypothesis H4 of whether CEO ownership and the firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk are associated with a vicissitude in diversification likelihood. CEO 
ownership is negative and significant at a 5% level, so the results accommodate the findings 
of Denis et al. (1997). The consistent negative relation between managers’ equity share and 
the degree of diversification signifies that potential private benefits gained from entering 
new markets will be offset by high ownership. Similarly, the coefficient for idiosyncratic 
risk is negative and significant denoting that higher firm-specific risk will dissuade 
managers from pursuing globalization strategies.  
Supplementally, as last robustness, I re-run the first regressions with another proxy, 
Big_d, for peer influence as used by Gao and Chou (2015). Big_d is an indicator that takes 
the values of 1 if the largest firm in the industry is globally diversified and 0 otherwise. 
Tables 3.18, 3.19 and 3.20 show that the peer influence results are robust to alternate 
specifications. 
In order to explore and enrich the understanding of born-global firms, I create the 
last sample BG M and examine BGs’ choices as public companies over their first four 
years. BGs’ alternatives in the first four years are as follows: to remain undiversified (4N) 
to diversify one year out of four (1D3N), two years out of four (2D2N), three years out of 
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four (3D1N) or diversify every year (4D). Tables 3.21-3.24 present the results of the 
multinomial logit regression for the variable of interest PIND alone and PIND and growth 
opportunities in tandem. The choice to remain undiversified (4N) is nominated as the 
baseline (reference) category and I calculate the log-odds for all the other four choices in 
relation to the baseline. PIND is adjusted directly proportional to the number of years of 
diversification. Each table in fact displays four separate logit regressions with firm-
characteristics as control variables. In all tables PIND is as good as before negative and 
significant at the 1 percent level. PIND shows once again that an increase in peer pressure 
negatively predicts more extensive diversification or in other words predicts less 
diversification years in the first four years.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
In this paper I look at what incentives are indeed important for global 
diversification. I narrow down the determinants’ variability by testing five hypotheses: 
industry peer pressure, growth or magnification desire, CEO entrenchment by ownership, 
extent of idiosyncratic risk, and firm’s innovation potential. I compact the US market into 
two separate categories of companies: young (BGs) and mature (BAGs). In each case I run 
the analysis by comparing samples of globally diversified firms to samples of firms 
specializing in internal markets. 
By and large I find that BGs and BAGs have fewer open doors to development after 
diversification. I find support for the idea that firms diversify to seek better growth 
prospects. Diversification thus becomes a means for growing the business in such a way as 
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to generate value for shareholders, with pre-existing growth being a strong deterrent to 
diversification. 
The other driving force that answers the question of what causes a decision for 
global diversification is a firm’s technological knowledge as reflected in patents and 
citations. Patents and citations are significantly and positively associated with global 
diversification, showing that acquired innovation moves managers to position their firms 
in international business environments. 
As there are many reasons for diversification, the elongated analyses most 
importantly demonstrate that there is no single crucial factor in a firm’s planning for global 
involvement. While I demonstrate that solid causal links exist between growth 
opportunities, number of patents or citations, and global diversification, I acknowledge that 
the same factors may assume different roles. While I see a “dark side” of industry peer 
pressure for BGs, BAGs feel no stress from competition because they are in fact positively 
influenced by the global involvement of their peers. Therefore, my claim that I have 
enhanced the understanding of marked differences between BGs and BAGs’ reactions is 
warranted. 
Finally, in the past decade it has proven arduous to assess the consequences 
predicted by the hypotheses. I concede that this project has been at best a decent first stage 
of the exploration of a topic that requires much future exploration. For one thing, my list 
of hypotheses is not exhaustive: there are other motivating forces like taxation to be 
investigated as well. As I have only examined what happens to born globals during the 
initial period, one possible theme of future research is what happens to born globals after 
that initial period.  
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APPENDIX A VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Age: number of years since the firm’s first PRCC_F in CRSP. 
Big_d (peer pressure dummy): equal to 1 if the largest firm in terms of total assets in the 
same industry is globally diversiﬁed and 0 otherwise. 
Cash_flow: ratio of the sum of earnings before extraordinary items (IB) and depreciation 
(DP) to lagged net property, plant, and equipment (PPENT). 
CEO_own (fractional equity ownership): shares (owned options excluded) divided by 
total common shares outstanding (CSHO). 
Div_d (global diversiﬁcation dummy): equal to 1 if a ﬁrm is globally diversiﬁed as 
reporting pre-tax foreign income in that year, and equal to 0 if a firm does not report 
pre-tax foreign income or any foreign sales. 
EBIT_Sale (firm proﬁtability): operating income after depreciation plus nonoperating 
income deﬂated by sales. 
GDP: real annual growth of GDP. 
G_O (growth opportunities): the ratio of capital expenditures (CAPX) to total assets 
(AT). 
L_N_patents: natural logarithm of the number of patents in that fiscal year plus 1. 
L_N_citations: natural logarithm of the number of citations a patent received in that fiscal 
year plus 1. 
Market value of assets: book value of assets plus market value of common equity 
(calendar year close times shares outstanding) less the sum of the book value of 
common equity and balance sheet deferred taxes. 
NWC (net working capital): lagged ratio of working capital (WCAP) divided by lagged 
total assets (AT) 
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PIND (industry influence): ratio of the fraction of all diversified firms in the industry (2-
digit SIC industry code) that are globally diversified in that fiscal year to the fraction 
of all domestic firms in the same industry (2-digit SIC industry code) that are not 
diversified 
ROA: ratio of EBITDA over lagged total assets (AT) 
 
R_D (R&D intensity): R&D expenditures scaled by total assets 
Size: the natural log of total firm assets (AT). 
 
TobinQ: ratio of the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets.  
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Table 3.1: Sample characteristics 
GLOBAL DIVERSIFIED FIRMS 
BORN GLOBAL 
     
Years of 
ongoing 
global 
interest IPO 
year = year1 Nr. of firms 
Nr. of global diversified 
firms 
Nr. of industrial 
diversified firms 
Nr. of firms with 
global experience in 
the prior 4 years 
     
BG 14 (1–4) 48 15 4 16 
     
BG 25 (2–5) 1,262 231 41 234 
     
BG 36 (3–6) 112 23 3 34 
     
BORN-AGAIN GLOBAL 
     
Years of 
continuous 
global 
interest Nr. of firms 
Nr. of global diversified 
firms 
Nr. of industrial 
diversified firms 
Nr. of firms with 
global experience in 
the prior 4 years 
     
BaG (4 years) 315 264 23 31 
This table displays the total number of firms and the number of global diversified firms in each 
sample. Each sample includes multi-segment (industrial) diversified firms and firms with prior international 
experience. 
  
 117 
Table 3.2: Distribution of focused and global diversified firms according to 38 Fama-French industry classifications 
GLOBAL DIVERSIFIED FIRMS 
  BG (14) BG (25) BG (36) BaG 
1 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0 4 0 0 
2 Mining 0 4 0 11 
3 Oil and Gas Extraction 1 30 2 5 
4 Nonmetallic Minerals 0 3 0 1 
5 Construction 0 3 2 0 
6 Food and Kindred 0 21 3 8 
8 Textile Mills 0 9 1 2 
9 Apparel and Other Textile 2 10 3 5 
10 Lumber and Wood 0 3 0 1 
11 Furniture and Fixtures 1 9 0 2 
12 Paper and Allied 0 2 1 0 
13 Printing and Publishing 2 8 1 2 
14 Chemicals and Allied 2 155 11 27 
15 Petroleum and Coal 0 1 0 1 
16 Rubber and Plastic 1 8 2 1 
17 Leather 0 5 0 1 
18 Stone, Clay and Glass 0 8 0 0 
19 Primary Metal 2 15 2 4 
20 Fabricated Metal 0 15 0 7 
21 Machinery, Except Electrical 2 80 7 20 
22 Electric and Electronic 8 111 12 50 
23 Transportation Equipment 1 20 3 9 
24 Instruments and Related 3 108 7 33 
I make use of only nonfinancial and nonregulated firms (SIC codes 6000–6999 and 4900–4959 are excluded). I do not report columns 7, 31 and 32 
because the samples do not incorporate Tobacco Products, Steam Supply and Irrigation Systems. 
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Table 3.2: Continued 
GLOBAL DIVERSIFIED FIRMS 
25 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 1 16 1 3 
26 Transportation 0 37 4 2 
27 Telephone and Telegraph 0 16 0 4 
28 Radio and Television 1 25 3 5 
29 Electric, Gas and Water Utilities 0 0 0 0 
30 Sanitary Services 0 13 0 4 
33 Wholesale 3 31 7 9 
34 Retail Stores 7 135 5 20 
35 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 0 0 0 0 
36 Services 11 338 31 74 
37 Public Administration 0 16 4 3 
38 Other 0 3 0 1 
  Total 48 1,262 112 315 
I make use of only nonfinancial and nonregulated firms (SIC codes 6000–6999 and 4900–4959 are excluded). I do not report columns 7, 31 and 32 
because the samples do not incorporate Tobacco Products, Steam Supply and Irrigation Systems.   
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of born global (BG) and born-again global (BaG) samples. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Ratio of Pretax-Foreign Income to 
Pretax-Income Ratio Assets Sales Total Value 
Min Mean Max Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Born Global (BG 14) 
0.06 0.38 1.34 723.9 263.2 826.3 353.2 925.8 547.5 
Born Global (BG 25) 
0.002 0.45 14.94 571.2 195.9 507.3 177.6 1,401.0 418.8 
Born Global (BG 36) 
0.01 0.62 2.05 516.9 114.8 637.7 135.3 1,171.5 312.8 
Born-again Global (BaG) 
0.0002 0.60 28.32 3,681.6 377.4 3,725.7 345.7 4,087.3 564.2 
 For the global diversified firms in each sample (Div=1), I report the ratio of pre-tax foreign income to pre-tax income, assets, sales and actual value. 
When the pre-tax foreign income is positive, I calculate its ratio to pre-tax income. Assets and Sales are total assets and net sales, respectively. Total Value or 
Actual Value is the firm’s total capital (market value of common equity plus book value of debt).
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics for born global (BG 25) sample. 
(BG 25) SUMMARY STATISTICS 
  Div=0 Div=1 
           
 Min Max Mean Median Std Min Max Mean Median Std 
PIND 0.003 0.80 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.002 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.03 
G_o t-1 -0.003 1.14 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.004 0.47 0.06 0.04 0.07 
L_N_patents t 0 3.69 0.38 0.00 0.75 0 4.89 0.68 0.00 1.04 
L_N_citations t  0 7.73 1.03 0.00 1.94 0 8.43 1.62 0.00 2.31 
L_Rd 0 5.03 1.63 1.68 1.30 0 6.40 2.37 2.35 1.28 
Ceo_own t 0.0001 0.41 0.07 0.03 0.10 0 0.52 0.05 0.01 0.10 
Std_r t 4.74 71.85 18.29 15.67 11.15 4.74 71.85 14.91 13.05 8.35 
Age 2 45 3.40 3 3.34 2 43 4.12 3 5.02 
Size t-1 0.68 9.85 4.23 4.14 1.31 1.59 9.42 5.14 5.02 1.32 
Cashflow t-1 -860.21 1,957.02 -5.08 0.35 76.51 -60.89 74.29 0.65 0.63 9.52 
Ebit_Sale t-1 -1,569.54 0.59 -5.92 0.06 58.62 -36.30 0.54 -0.09 0.10 2.40 
ROA t-1 -26.68 132.04 2.49 1.36 9.96 -16.99 145.79 9.02 4.13 16.97 
Nwc t-1 -46.43 132.97 8.89 6.28 11.13 -60.16 290.30 14.11 9.34 24.26 
TobinQ t-1 0.30 100.81 3.77 2.59 5.27 0.92 38.48 3.50 2.48 3.58 
Gdp t-1 6,539.30 14,477.6 8,990.53 8,608.50 2,237.28 6,539.30 14,477.60 9,683.73 8,608.50 2,670.52 
The table presents minimums, maximums, means, medians, and standard deviations for all variables included in the regression models. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Appendix A provides detailed definitions of all variables considered. Columns 2 to 6 include domestic 
firms with no international involvement for 4 years (N=1031). Columns 7 to 11 contain observations of global  firms in the sample (N=231).
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Table 3.5: Pearson correlation matrix for born global (BG 25) sample. 
    PEARSON CORRELATION  
  
 PIND G_o  
L_n_ 
patents 
L_n_ 
citations L_Rd 
Ceo_ 
own Std_r Age 
Size Cashflow 
 Ebit_Sale ROA  Nwc  
Div 
 (0.41) (0.09) .15 .11 .23 (0.08) (0.12) .08 .26 .03 .04 .21 .14 
PIND  (0.02) .001 .01 .10 (0.02) .21 .001 .02 (0.06) (0.02) (0.14) .06 
G_o   (0.13) (0.14) (0.27) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) .06 .01 .04 .05 (0.12) 
L_n_ 
patents    .92 .47 .05 .06 .05 .05 (0.001) (0.05) (0.05) .19 
L_n_ 
citations     .43 .10 .10 .02 (0.03) (0.003) (0.03) (0.09) .15 
L_Rd      (0.002) .20 (0.03) (0.28) (0.13) (0.08) (0.02) (0.41) 
Ceo_ 
own       .13 (0.08) (0.13) .01 .06 (0.09) .01 
Std_r        (0.05) (0.17) (0.06) (0.03) (0.29) .03 
Age         .22 .001 (0.01) .29 (0.03) 
Size          .12 .05 .56 .38 
Cashflow           .04 .19 (0.12) 
Ebit_Sale            .08 (0.02) 
Roa             .22 
The correlations are based on the BG 25 sample of 1,262 firms. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.   
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Table 3.5: Continued 
PEARSON CORRELATION 
 PIND G_o  L_n_ patents 
L_n_ 
citations L_Rd Ceo_own Std_r Age 
Size Cashflow 
 Ebit_Sale ROA  Nwc  TobinQ Gdp 
Div 
              (0.02) .11 
PIND 1             .07 .25 
G_o  1            (0.04) (0.06) 
L_n_ 
patents   1           .04 .11 
L_n_ 
citations    1          .08 .01 
L_Rd     1         .28 .26 
Ceo_ 
own      1        (0.04) (0.001) 
Std_r       1       .21 .11 
Age        1      (0.06) .06 
Size         1     (0.06) .40 
Cashflow          1    (0.09) (0.06) 
Ebit_Sale           1   (0.04) (0.00) 
Roa            1  (0.11) 0.11 
Nwc             1 0.16 0.25 
TobinQ              1 0.05 
Gdp               1 
The correlations are based on the BG 25 sample of 1,262 firms. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
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Table 3.6: Logistic regression of the decision to globally diversify with growth opportunities, peer pressure and year fixed effects 
as regressors for the born global (BG 14) sample. 
 !"# = %& + %()*+ + %,-./ℎ	234567( + %89:";_=.3+67( + %>?5@67( + %A="B+67( + %CD4:"EF67(+ %GHIJ67( + %KH_467(	(1) 
(BG 14) LOGISTIC REGRESSION – GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PEER PRESSURE 
  Div 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.103 0.18 -0.022 0.054 -0.031 0.044 
 (-0.89) (-1.14) (-0.48) (1.15) (-0.56) (-0.93) 
Cashflow t-1 -0.324 0.202 -0.308 -0.062 -0.309 -0.079 
 (-0.69) (-0.46) (-1.56) (-1.35) (-1.10) (-0.89) 
Ebit_Sale t-1 3.145**  2.329**  2.143**  
 (-3.05)  (2.36)  (-2.53)  
ROA t-1  -0.039  -0.022  -0.036 
  (-0.92)  (-0.66)  (-1.09) 
Nwc t-1 -0.032** -0.049** -0.033*** -0.047** -0.038*** -0.054** 
 (-2.42) (-2.01) (-2.98) (-2.38) (-2.96) (-2.48) 
Size t-1 1.08* 1.521 1.158** 1.516** 1.248** 1.617** 
 (-1.77) (-1.62) (2.51) (2.07) (-2.65) (-2.37) 
TobinQ t-1 -0.999* -0.71 0.026 0.349 0.288 0.417 
 (-1.91) (-1.64) (0.03) (0.74) (-0.35) (-0.67) 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.6: Continued 
(BG 14) LOGISTIC REGRESSION - GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PEER PRESSURE 
Gdp t-1 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0009** 0.0008** 0.001 0.001** 
 (-1.28) (-1.11) (2.08) (2.10) (-1.92) (-2.17) 
G_o t-1 -47.58** -26.27   31.17* 33.13** 
 (-1.97) (-1.15)   (-1.65) (-2.06) 
PIND   -122.4* -91.18** -140* -120.7** 
   (-1.94) (-2.24) (-1.86) (-2.29) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No 
N 34 34 47 48 47 47 
Pseudo R-sq 0.52 0.456 0.643 0.572 0.656 0.624 
 The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
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Table 3.7: Logistic regression of the decision to globally diversify with growth opportunities, peer pressure and year fixed effects 
as regressors for the born global (BG 25) sample. !"# = %& + %()*+ + %,-./ℎ	234567( + %89:";_=.3+67( + %>?5@67( + %A="B+67( + %CD4:"EF67( +%GHIJ67( + %KH_467(	(1)  
(BG 25) LOGISTIC REGRESSION – GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PEER PRESSURE 
Div 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.002 -0.002 0.042 0.052* 0.038 0.051* 
 (0.12) (-0.08) (1.39) (1.94) (1.12) (1.79) 
Cashflow t-1 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0005 0.00004 -0.001 -0.0005 
 (-1.12) (-0.57) (-0.54) (0.05) (-1.10) (-0.58) 
Ebit_Sale t-1 0.245  0.028  0.033  
 (0.87)  (0.45)  (0.56)  
ROA t-1  0.004  -0.017  -0.022* 
  (0.45)  (-1.66)  (-2.17) 
Nwc t-1 0.008 0.005 0.023** 0.020** 0.016** 0.014** 
 (1.25) (0.95) (2.29) (1.97) (2.00) (2.05) 
Size t-1 0.433*** 0.480*** 0.208** 0.324** 0.295** 0.431*** 
 (5.91) (5.91) (2.09) (2.79) (2.88) (3.71) 
TobinQ t-1 0.015 0.007 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 
 (0.98) (0.60) (3.31) (3.39) (3.50) (3.43) 
Gdp t-1 0.0002 0.00008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 
 (0.28) (0.12) (0.84) (0.83) (0.86) (0.82) 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
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Table 3.7: Continued 
(BG 25) LOGISTIC REGRESSION – GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PEER PRESSURE 
PIND   -63.06*** -64.51*** -65.71*** -66.98*** 
   (-10.74) (-10.81) (-10.54) (-10.58) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,223 1,223 1,223 1,262 1,223 1,223 
Pseudo R-sq 0.123 0.100 0.518 0.523 0.543 0.545 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
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Table 3.8: Logistic regression of the decision to globally diversify with growth opportunities, peer pressure and year fixed effects 
as regressors for the born global (BG 36) sample. !"# = %& + %()*+ + %,-./ℎ	234567( + %89:";_=.3+67( + %>?5@67( + %A="B+67( + %CD4:"EF67( +%GHIJ67( + %KH_467(	(1)  
(BG 36) LOGISTIC REGRESSION– GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PEER PRESSURE 
  Div 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age -0.265 -0.374 -0.151 -0.149 -0.122 -0.130 
 (-1.00) (-1.58) (-0.43) (-0.39) (-0.36) (-0.36) 
Cashflow t-1 0.034 0.103 -0.018 0.067 -0.02 0.066 
 (1.34) (1.21) (-0.53) (1.02) (-0.60) (0.96) 
Ebit_Sale t-1 1.554  2.739  2.138  
 (1.58)  (0.70)  (0.82)  
ROA t-1  0.095**  0.0719  0.0643 
  (2.55)  (0.81)  (0.90) 
Nwc t-1 -0.003 -0.015 -0.005 -0.049 -0.005 -0.046 
 (-0.20) (-0.87) (-0.24) (-0.82) (-0.22) (-0.86) 
Size t-1 0.408* 0.142 -0.197 -0.145 -0.192 -0.115 
 (1.78) (0.55) (-0.52) (-0.37) (-0.50) (-0.31) 
TobinQ t-1 0.092 0.168* 0.035 0.061 0.024 0.048 
 (0.89) (1.87) (0.39) (0.62) (0.27) (0.54) 
Gdp t-1 -0.002 -0.002 0.00002 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0004 
 (-0.79) (-0.82) (0.01) (-0.15) (0.04) (-0.14) 
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Table 3.8: Continued 
(BG 36) LOGISTIC REGRESSION – GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PEER PRESSURE 
G_o t-1 -2.015 -2.202   -3.414 -2.864 
 (-0.74) (-0.81)   (-0.58) (-0.49) 
PIND   -54.68*** -52.34*** -55.75*** -52.84*** 
   (-3.51) (-3.44) (-3.53) (-3.52) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 97 97 97 99 97 97 
Pseudo R-sq 0.194 0.224 0.526 0.517 0.530 0.516 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.9: Robustness test - Logistic regression of the decision to globally diversify with growth opportunities, peer pressure and 
industry fixed effects as regressors for the born global (BG 25) sample. !"# = %& + %()*+ + %,-./ℎ	234567( + %89:";_=.3+67( + %>?5@67( + %A="B+67( + %CD4:"EF67( + %GHIJ67( + %KH_467( 
 
(BG 25) ROBUSTNESS TEST – GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PEER PRESSURE 
  
  Div 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.002 -0.02 -0.035 -0.029 -0.031 -0.024 
 (0.09) (-0.67) (-1.18) (-0.98) (-1.04) (-0.83) 
Cashflow t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.90) (-1.17) (-0.62) (-0.77) (-0.50) (-0.65) 
Ebit_Sale t-1 0.301  0.0702  0.068  
 (0.85)  (0.78)  (0.75)  
ROA t-1  0.025**  -0.014  -0.014 
  (2.21)  (-1.33)  (-1.28) 
Nwc t-1 -0.004 -0.012** -0.0001 0.0004 0.002 0.001 
 (-0.88) (-1.97) (-0.01) (0.05) (0.13) (0.14) 
Size t-1 0.718*** 0.680*** 0.946*** 1.068*** 0.936*** 1.042*** 
 (7.47) (7.28) (6.40) (6.57) (6.28) (6.29) 
TobinQ t-1 -0.029 -0.029 0.027 0.02 0.024 0.017 
 (-1.34) (-1.53) (1.60) (1.36) (1.39) (1.11) 
Gdp t-1 0.00002 0.00002 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.66) (0.55) (5.53) (5.41) (5.57) (5.46) 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and industry dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses 
below. *, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.9: Continued 
(BG 25) ROBUSTNESS TEST – GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PEER PRESSURE 
G_o t-1 1.043 1.389   2.034 2.098 
 (0.74) (0.97)   (1.30) (1.40) 
PIND   -25.78*** -26.39*** -25.96*** -26.27*** 
   (-10.54) (-10.83) (-10.39) (-10.66) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1094 1094 1094 1132 1094 1094 
Pseudo R-sq 0.203 0.184 0.554 0.556 0.555 0.553 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and industry dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses 
below. *, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.10: Robustness test - Logistic regression of the decision to globally diversify with growth opportunities, peer pressure and 
industry fixed effects as regressors for the born global (BG 36) sample. !"# = %& + %()*+ + %,-./ℎ	234567( + %89:";_=.3+67( + %>?5@67( + %A="B+67( + %CD4:"EF67( + %GHIJ67( + %KH_467( 
 
(BG 36) ROBUSTNESS TEST – GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PEER PRESSURE 
    Div 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age -0.695* -0.665* -0.217 -0.222 -0.208 -0.156 
 (-1.69) (-1.65) (-0.49) (-0.51) (-0.45) (-0.33) 
Cashflow t-1 0.047 0.114 -0.069* 0.047 -0.068* 0.047 
 (0.47) (1.30) (-1.81) (1.07) (-1.75) (0.99) 
Ebit_Sale t-1 1.193  0.876  0.791  
 (0.89)  (1.33)  (1.09)  
ROA t-1  0.025  -0.180**  -0.227** 
  (0.39)  (-2.14)  (-2.60) 
Nwc t-1 0.087** 0.086* 0.196 0.244** 0.200* 0.289** 
 (2.29) (1.67) (1.58) (2.31) (1.65) (2.65) 
Size t-1 0.849 0.849 0.315 0.534 0.354 0.628 
 (1.62) (1.54) (0.31) (0.53) (0.35) (0.70) 
TobinQ t-1 0.054 0.038 -0.066 -0.097 -0.057 -0.109 
 (0.75) (0.49) (-0.64) (-1.03) (-0.53) (-1.22) 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.10: Continued 
(BG 36) ROBUSTNESS TEST 
Gdp t-1 -0.0007** -0.0007* -0.00002 0.0002 -0.00009 0.0002 
 (-2.05) (-1.90) (-0.06) (0.67) (-0.18) (0.61) 
G_o t-1 -1.365 -2.250   4.015 9.010 
 (-0.25) (-0.43)   (0.40) (1.22) 
PIND   -30.18*** -30.70*** -30.46*** -34.05*** 
   (-3.10) (-3.50) (-3.38) (-4.03) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 72 72 72 73 72 72 
Pseudo R-sq 0.432 0.428 0.621 0.630 0.622 0.634 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 133 
Table 3.11: Logistic regression of the decision to globally diversify with growth opportunities, peer pressure and year fixed effects 
as regressors for the born again global (BaG) sample. !"# = %& + %()*+ + %,-./ℎ	234567( + %89:";_=.3+67( + %>?5@67( + %A="B+67( + %CD4:"EF67( + %GH_467( 
 
(BaG) LOGISTIC REGRESSION – GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PEER PRESSURE 
Div 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.212** 0.193** 0.187* 0.149* 0.246*** 0.319** 
 (2.93) (2.23) (1.84) (1.74) (2.75) (2.30) 
Cashflow t-1 1.809* 1.497* 1.832** 1.447** 1.877** 2.546*** 
 (1.90) (1.67) (1.95) (2.24) (2.40) (2.75) 
Ebit_Sale t-1 -5.509  -5.45  1.360  
 (-1.16)  (-1.33)  (0.33)  
ROA t-1  -0.011  -0.012  -0.029 
  (-1.24)  (-1.54)  (-1.82) 
Nwc t-1 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 0.005 -0.0007 0.009 
 (-1.33) (-0.53) (-0.49) (1.05) (-0.17) (1.18) 
Size t-1 0.636** 0.795 0.315 0.316 0.400 0.916* 
 (1.99) (1.63) (1.23) (0.97) (1.47) (1.86) 
TobinQ t-1 -1.168* -1.345* -1.441 -1.465* -1.547* -2.118** 
 (-1.70) (-1.86) (-1.49) (-1.65) (-1.69) (-2.01) 
G_o t-1 -20.91** -26.01**   -40.42*** -40.72*** 
 (-1.98) (-2.16)   (-2.83) (-2.94) 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.11: Continued 
(BaG) LOGISTIC REGRESSION - GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PEER PRESSURE 
PIND   204.5*** 213.1*** 338.9** 416.5** 
   (2.67) (2.62) (2.33) (1.98) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Pseudo R-sq 0.306 0.320 0.380 0.357 0.522 0.591 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.12: Robustness test - Logistic regression of the decision to globally diversify with growth opportunities, peer pressure and 
industry fixed effects as regressors for the born again global (BaG) sample. !"# = %& + %()*+ + %,-./ℎ	234567( + %89:";_=.3+67( + %>?5@67( + %A="B+67( + %CD4:"EF67( + %GH_467( 
 
(BaG) ROBUSTNESS TEST – GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PEER PRESSURE  
Div 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.110* 0.097* 0.135** 0.076 0.265*** 0.147** 
 (1.88) (1.82) (2.10) (1.52) (2.92) (2.06) 
Cashflow t-1 0.087*** 0.026 0.175*** 0.062* 0.263*** 0.097* 
 (3.23) (1.26) (3.19) (1.83) (2.99) (1.69) 
Ebit_Sale t-1 -1.825**  -3.057***  -3.203***  
 (-4.30)  (-2.85)  (-5.54)  
ROA t-1  -0.003  0.002  0.0004 
  (-0.68)  (0.29)  (0.06) 
Nwc t-1 -0.012*** -0.009** -0.008** -0.006 -0.012** -0.008 
 (-3.21) (-2.03) (-1.99) (-1.37) (-2.22) (-1.18) 
Size t-1 0.526** 0.465** 0.373 0.248 0.639** 0.360* 
 (2.14) (2.10) (1.48) (1.11) (1.97) (1.65) 
TobinQ t-1 0.00001 -0.028 0.137 -0.071 0.499* 0.129 
 (0.00) (-0.19) (0.72) (-0.48) (1.74) (0.66) 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal 
to one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and industry dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses 
below. *, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.12: Continued 
(BaG) ROBUSTNESS TEST – GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PEER PRESSURE 
G_o t-1 -17.12*** -15.27***   -40.72*** -23.75** 
 (-3.28) (-2.99)   (-2.85) (-2.00) 
PIND   346.5*** 278.6*** 493.1*** 313.6** 
   (4.85) (3.51) (3.51) (2.48) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 198 198 198 203 198 198 
Pseudo R-sq 0.346 0.293 0.523 0.440 0.613 0.496 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and industry dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses 
below. *, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.13: Logistic regression of the decision to globally diversify with patents, citations, or R&D, and year fixed effects as 
regressors for the born global (BG 25) sample. !"# = %& + %()*+ + %,-./ℎ	234567( + %89:";_=.3+67( + %>?5@67( + %A="B+67( + %CD4:"EF67( + %GO_?_P.;+E;/67( 
 
(BG 25) LOGISTIC REGRESSION – PATENTS, CITATIONS AND R&D 
  Div 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age -0.003 -0.009 -0.002 -0.007 0.021 0.001 
 (-0.13) (-0.43) (-0.08) (-0.37) (0.74) (0.04) 
Cashflow t-1 -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.0002 0.032 0.054*** 
 (-1.24) (-0.28) (-1.22) (-0.25) (1.08) (2.93) 
Ebit_Sale t-1 0.313  0.316  0.286  
 (0.86)  (0.85)  (0.65)  
ROA t-1  0.007  0.007  0.035* 
  (0.93)  (0.85)  (1.82) 
Nwc t-1 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004 -0.008 -0.021** 
 (0.97) (0.62) (1.02) (0.71) (-1.39) (-2.56) 
Size t-1 0.415*** 0.470*** 0.426*** 0.485*** 0.489*** 0.486*** 
 (5.25) (5.66) (5.37) (5.75) (3.54) (3.74) 
TobinQ t-1 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.0003 -0.052 -0.038 
 (0.44) (0.26) (0.12) (0.02) (-1.42) (-1.22) 
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Table 3.13: Continued 
 (BG 25) LOGISTIC REGRESSION – PATENTS, CITATIONS AND R&D 
Gdp t-1 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 
 (0.37) (0.14) (0.35) (0.12) (0.19) (-0.02) 
L_N_patents 0.528*** 0.422***     
 (5.33) (5.24)     
L_N_citations  0.221*** 0.175***   
   (5.29) (5.07)   
L_Rd     0.654*** 0.622*** 
     (5.88) (6.76) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1223 1262 1223 1262 814 830 
Pseudo R-sq 0.133 0.107 0.132 0.107 0.217 0.201 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and industry dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses 
below. *, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.14: Logistic regression of the decision to globally diversify with patents, citations, or R&D, and year fixed effects as 
regressors for the born global (BG 36) sample. !"# = %& + %()*+ + %,-./ℎ	234567( + %89:";_=.3+67( + %>?5@67( + %A="B+67( + %CD4:"EF67( + %GO_?_P.;+E;/67( 
 
(BG 36) LOGISTIC REGRESSION – PATENTS, CITATIONS AND R&D 
 Div 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Age -0.497* -0.455* -0.405 -0.417* -1.216** -1.745*** 
 (-1.75) (-1.72) (-1.63) (-1.68) (-1.99) (-2.87) 
Cashflow t-1 0.043* 0.181 0.042* 0.162 0.072 0.083 
 (1.65) (1.47) (1.65) (1.31) (0.81) (1.36) 
Ebit_Sale t-1 1.932**  1.932**  3.375  
 (2.51)  (2.21)  (1.54)  
ROA t-1  0.061  0.074*  0.454 
  (1.45)  (1.90)  (1.31) 
Nwc t-1 -0.007 -0.012 -0.004 -0.011 -0.065* -0.138* 
 (-0.48) (-0.73) (-0.30) (-0.69) (-1.85) (-1.84) 
Size t-1 0.463* 0.295 0.472** 0.247 1.046 0.122 
 (1.92) (1.12) (2.00) (0.96) (1.64) (0.18) 
TobinQ t-1 0.129 0.140 0.0894 0.137 -0.078 0.427 
 (1.34) (1.34) (0.97) (1.36) (-0.80) (1.45) 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and industry dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses 
below. *, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.14: Continued 
(BG 36) LOGISTIC REGRESSION – PATENTS, CITATIONS AND R&D 
Gdp t-1 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.0004 -0.010 
 (-0.49) (-0.96) (-0.55) (-0.95) (-0.19) (-0.85) 
L_N_patents 0.994*** 0.605*     
 (2.87) (1.84)     
L_N_citations   0.354** 0.190   
   (2.40) (1.40)   
L_Rd     1.283*** 1.397** 
     (2.77) (2.38) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 97 99 97 99 59 60 
Pseudo R-sq 0.265 0.248 0.245 0.239 0.418 0.516 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and industry dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses 
below. *, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.15: Logistic regression of the decision to globally diversify with patents, citations, or R&D, and year fixed effects as 
regressors for the born again global (BaG) sample. !"# = %& + %()*+ + %,-./ℎ	234567( + %89:";_=.3+67( + %>?5@67( + %A="B+67( + %CD4:"EF67( + %GO_?_P.;+E;/67( 
 
(BaG) LOGISTIC REGRESSION – PATENTS, CITATIONS AND R&D 
Div 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.124 0.082 0.124 0.081 
 (-1.42) (-1.18) (1.41) (1.21) 
Cashflow t-1 1.553 1.169 1.657* 1.319 
 (-1.52) (-1.3) (1.67) (1.45) 
Ebit_Sale t-1 -5.519  -5.629  
 (-1.22)  (-1.22)  
ROA t-1  -0.003  -0.003 
  (-0.21)  (-0.20) 
Nwc t-1 -0.013 -0.011 -0.015* -0.013 
 (-1.95) (-1.35) (-2.07) (-1.53) 
Size t-1 0.4 0.271 0.499 0.366 
 (-1.19) (-0.9) (1.42) (1.25) 
TobinQ t-1 -0.587 -0.581 -0.538 -0.562 
 (-0.82) (-0.94) (-0.78) (-0.94) 
L_N_patents 0.611* 0.656*   
 (-2.11) (-2.18)   
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.15: Continued 
(BaG) LOGISTIC REGRESSION – PATENTS, CITATIONS AND R&D  
L_N_citations   0.472** 0.502** 
   (2.42) (2.51) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 40 40 40 40 
Pseudo R-sq 0.373 0.351 0.416 0.394 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.16: Logistic regression of the decision to globally diversify with CEO ownership, year and industry fixed effects as 
regressors for the born global (BG 25) sample. !"# = %& + %()*+ + %,-./ℎ	234567( + %89:";_=.3+67( + %>?5@67( + %A="B+67( + %CD4:"EF67(+ %GHIJ67( + %K-9Q_45E 
(BG 25) LOGISTIC REGRESSION – CEO OWNERSHIP 
Div 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age -0.474 -0.615 -0.136 -0.122* -0.857 -1.270** 
 (-1.40) (-1.62) (-1.48) (-1.68) (-1.45) (-1.98) 
Cashflow t-1 0.220** 0.554*** 0.395** 0.419** 0.273 1.192*** 
 (1.95) (2.98) (2.59) (2.65) (1.02) (3.41) 
Ebit_Sale t-1 1.274  -0.294  3.336  
 (1.39)  (-0.67)  (1.48)  
ROA t-1  -0.284**  -0.0229  -1.076** 
  (-2.15)  (-1.15)  (-2.99) 
Nwc t-1 0.0350 0.156* 0.004 0.008 0.019 0.307** 
 (1.05) (1.88) (0.24) (0.52) (0.31) (2.26) 
Size t-1 -0.710 0.662 0.254 0.523 -0.519 4.884** 
 (-1.33) (0.97) (0.88) (1.35) (-0.76) (2.28) 
TobinQ t-1 -0.002 -0.007 0.005 0.011 -0.009 -0.057 
 (-0.11) (-0.30) (0.22) (0.47) (-0.30) (-1.15) 
Gdp t-1 0.0003** 0.0003** -0.001 -0.001 -0.011** -0.015* 
 (2.13) (2.02) (-1.09) (-1.14) (-2.23) (-1.84) 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant, industry and/or year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses below. *, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.16: Continued 
(BG 25) LOGISTIC REGRESSION – CEO OWNERSHIP 
Ceo_own -8.964** -10.24** -4.458 -4.670 -13.13** -11.76** 
 (-2.32) (-2.49) (-1.53) (-1.61) (-2.31) (-2.07) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 58 58 100 100 50 50 
Pseudo R-sq 0.382 0.435 0.217 0.224 0.521 0.659 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant, industry and/or year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses below. *, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.17: Logistic regression of the decision to globally diversify with idiosyncratic risk, year and industry fixed effects as 
regressors for the born global (BG 25) sample 
 !"# = %& + %()*+ + %,-./ℎ	234567( + %89:";_=.3+67( + %>?5@67( + %A="B+67( + %CD4:"EF67( + %GHIJ67( + %K=;I_R 
(BG 25) LOGISTIC REGRESSION – IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK 
Div 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age -0.002 -0.015 0.007 0.004 -0.008 -0.017 
 (-0.10) (-0.67) (0.40) (0.24) (-0.39) (-0.73) 
Cashflow t-1 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0006 0.00005 -0.001 -0.0006 
 (-1.04) (-0.74) (-0.91) (0.06) (-1.40) (-0.73) 
Ebit_Sale t-1 0.242  0.204  0.206  
 (0.82)  (0.85)  (0.78)  
ROA t-1  0.018  0.001  0.009 
  (1.59)  (0.14)  (0.85) 
Nwc t-1 -0.006 -0.011** 0.011 0.009 -0.007 -0.010 
 (-1.16) (-1.96) (1.58) (1.39) (-1.35) (-1.75) 
Size t-1 0.695*** 0.687*** 0.369*** 0.431*** 0.795*** 0.821*** 
 (7.29) (7.21) (5.11) (5.17) (7.53) (7.49) 
TobinQ t-1 -0.0134 -0.0159 0.014 0.007 -0.012 -0.014 
 (-0.69) (-1.05) (0.99) (0.58) (-0.60) (-0.88) 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant, industry and/or year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses below. *, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.17: Continued 
 (BG 25) LOGISTIC REGRESSION – IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK  
Gdp t-1 0.00003 0.00003 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0006 
 (0.86) (0.71) (0.39) (0.29) (-0.44) (-0.74) 
Std_r -0.033** -0.037*** -0.016 -0.023** -0.020 -0.025** 
 (-2.59) (-3.25) (-1.49) (-2.19) (-1.58) (-2.04) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1093 1131 1231 1271 1093 1131 
Pseudo R-sq 0.212 0.200 0.108 0.093 0.233 0.222 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant, industry and/or year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses below. *, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.18: Robustness test - Logistic regression of the decision to globally diversify with alternative peer pressure variable 
definition and year fixed effects as regressors for the born global (BG 14) sample !"# = %& + %()*+ + %,-./ℎ	234567( + %89:";_=.3+67( + %>?5@67( + %A="B+67( + %CD4:"EF67( + %GHIJ67( + %KS"*_I 
(BG 14) ROBUSTNESS TEST – ALTERNATIVE PEER PRESSURE 
Div 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.185** 0.305** 0.203** 0.303* 
 (2.36) (3.03) (2.25) (2.08) 
Cashflow t-1 -0.148 0.355** -0.099 0.338 
 (-0.37) (2.23) (-0.28) (1.34) 
Ebit_Sale t-1 12.13  6.542  
 (0.90)  (0.58)  
ROA t-1  -0.073*  -0.071 
  (-1.76)  (-1.20) 
Nwc t-1 -0.051** -0.096*** -0.057** -0.095** 
 (-2.37) (-3.87) (-2.39) (-2.71) 
Size t-1 1.005 2.526*** 1.354* 2.531** 
 (1.37) (2.89) (1.76) (2.04) 
TobinQ t-1 -3.443 -1.326 -3.161* -1.381 
 (-1.35) (-1.64) (-1.68) (-1.81) 
Gdp t-1 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.0004 
 (-1.07) (-0.69) (-1.49) (-0.83) 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant, and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.18: Continued 
(BG 14) ROBUSTNESS TEST – ALTERNATIVE PEER PRESSURE 
G_o t-1   -38.62 -13.31 
   (-1.26) (-0.47) 
Big_d -5.076** -4.629*** -4.533** -4.376** 
 (-2.31) (-3.38) (-2.13) (-3.09) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 35 36 35 35 
Pseudo R-sq 0.61 0.571 0.629 0.569 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant, and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.19: Robustness test - Logistic regression of the decision to globally diversify with alternative peer pressure variable 
definition and year fixed effects as regressors for the born global (BG 25) sample !"# = %& + %()*+ + %,-./ℎ	234567( + %89:";_=.3+67( + %>?5@67( + %A="B+67( + %CD4:"EF67( + %GHIJ67( + %KS"*_I 
 
(BG 25) ROBUSTNESS TEST – ALTERNATIVE PEER PRESSURE 
Div 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.008 0.003 0.003 -0.0005 
 (0.43) (0.15) (0.16) (-0.02) 
Cashflow t-1 -0.0006 0.000001 -0.0008 -0.0005 
 (-0.88) (0.00) (-1.13) (-0.61) 
Ebit_Sale t-1 0.219  0.241  
 (0.82)  (0.85)  
ROA t-1  0.004  0.004 
  (0.56)  (0.46) 
Nwc t-1 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.006 
 (1.53) (1.28) (1.24) (0.93) 
Size t-1 0.393*** 0.451*** 0.438*** 0.484*** 
 (5.32) (5.44) (5.94) (5.90) 
TobinQ t-1 0.009 0.004 0.013 0.006 
 (0.66) (0.28) (0.85) (0.44) 
Gdp t-1 0.0002 0.00009 0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.34) (0.12) (0.30) (0.16) 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant, and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.19: Continued 
 (BG 25) ROBUSTNESS TEST – ALTERNATIVE PEER PRESSURE 
G_o t-1   -4.555*** -4.053*** 
   (-3.50) (-3.29) 
Big_d -0.283* -0.336** -0.200 -0.262 
 (-1.72) (-2.05) (-1.21) (-1.60) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1232 1272 1232 1232 
Pseudo R-sq 0.108 0.093 0.125 0.104 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant, and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.20: Robustness test - Logistic regression of the decision to globally diversify with alternative peer pressure variable 
definition and year fixed effects as regressors for the born global (BG 36) sample !"# = %& + %()*+ + %,-./ℎ	234567( + %89:";_=.3+67( + %>?5@67( + %A="B+67( + %CD4:"EF67( + %GHIJ67( + %KS"*_I 
 
(BG 36) ROBUSTNESS TEST – ALTERNATIVE PEER PRESSURE  
Div 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age -0.293 -0.403* -0.271 -0.380 
 (-1.06) (-1.67) (-1.00) (-1.62) 
Cashflow t-1 0.034 0.122 0.032 0.102 
 (1.36) (1.06) (1.30) (1.09) 
Ebit_Sale t-1 1.848  1.665  
 (1.53)  (1.54)  
ROA t-1  0.098**  0.098** 
  (2.60)  (2.58) 
Nwc t-1 -0.002 -0.012 -0.004 -0.016 
 (-0.11) (-0.79) (-0.22) (-0.91) 
Size t-1 0.409 0.148 0.417 0.148 
 (1.82) (0.59) (1.80) (0.57) 
TobinQ t-1 0.101 0.180 0.099 0.177 
 (0.96) (1.95) (0.93) (1.94) 
Gdp t-1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.85) (-0.99) (-0.81) (-0.84) 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant, and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.20: Continued 
(BG 36) ROBUSTNESS TEST – ALTERNATIVE PEER PRESSURE 
G_o t-1   -1.790 -1.982 
   (-0.67) (-0.75) 
Big_d 0.337 0.363 0.311 0.321 
 (0.54) (0.56) (0.50) (0.51) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 98 100 98 98 
Pseudo R-sq 0.190 0.225 0.193 0.223 
The table presents results of logit analysis with the firm’s ongoing diversification as the dependent variable. The dependent variable Div is equal to 
one if the firm diversifies in four consecutive years and zero otherwise. The independent variables definitions are provided in Appendix A. The regression 
includes a constant, and year dummies (not reported). p-values of the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below. 
*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.21: Multinomial Logistic Regression with firm profitability (Ebit_Sale) and peer pressure (PIND) as regressors for BG M 
sample 
 
(BG M) MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION – PROFITABILITY AND PEER PRESSURE 
  
  
Ln(1D3N/4N)  Ln(2D2N/4N)  Ln(3D1N/4N)  Ln(4D/4N)  
Coefficients ME Coefficients ME Coefficients ME Coefficients ME 
        
Age -0.44 <0.001 -0.74 <0.001 -0.24 -0.060 0.01 0.022 
 0.05  0.24  0.01  0.88  
Cashflow -0.06 <0.001 -0.04 <0.001 -0.05 -0.007 -0.08 -0.008 
 0.02  0.08  0.03  0.13  
Ebit_Sale -0.01 <0.001 0.02 <0.001 0.00 -0.030 0.33 0.053 
 0.97  0.95  0.99  0.75  
NWC 0.00 <0.001 0.03 <0.001 -0.08 -0.017 -0.02 0.003 
 0.97  0.70  0.30  0.12  
Size 0.96 <0.001 0.59 <0.001 0.82 0.138 0.74 0.044 
 0.01  0.13  0.02  0.02  
PIND -464.4 -0.001 -1319.9 <0.001 -88.38 -20.575 -14.63 5.379 
  
  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.03   
The dependent variable takes the values of 0 when the firm manifests 4N profile, 1 when the firm is 1D3N has one year of diversification, 2 when the 
firm is 2D2N has two years of diversification, 3 when the firm belongs to the 3D1N profile have three years of diversification, and 4 when the firm is diversified 
over its first four years as a public company. Fifteen firms belong to the 4D profile (see Table 3.1). T-statistics are reported below the coefficients. Marginal 
effects measure the change in predicted probability for a unit change in the variable. 
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Table 3.22: Multinomial Logistic Regression with ROA and peer pressure (PIND) as regressors for BG M sample 
 
(BG M) MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION – ROA AND PEER PRESSURE 
  
  Ln(1D3N/4N) Ln(2D2N/4N) Ln(3D1N/4N) Ln(4D/4N) 
 Coefficients ME Coefficients ME Coefficients ME Coefficients ME 
         
Age -0.42 -<0.001 -0.79 -<0.001 -0.23 -0.058 0.02 0.023 
 0.06  0.24  0.03  0.62  
Cashflow -0.06 -<0.001 -0.05 -<0.001 -0.05 -0.007 -0.06 -0.005 
 0.05  0.14  0.10  0.16  
ROA 0.07 <0.001 0.06 <0.001 0.02 0.008 -0.03 -0.006 
 0.19  0.26  0.51  0.33  
NWC -0.02 <0.001 0.02 <0.001 -0.10 -0.022 -0.03 0.004 
 0.76  0.80  0.18  0.06  
Size 0.73 <0.001 0.41 -<0.001 0.76 0.104 0.97 0.089 
 0.09  0.35  0.04  0.02  
PIND -486 <0.001 -1376.3 -<0.001 -83.72 -19.3 -14.5 4.877 
  
  <.0001   <.0001   0.00   0.02   
The dependent variable takes the values of 0 when the firm manifests 4N profile, 1 when the firm is 1D3N has one year of diversification, 2 when the 
firm is 2D2N has two years of diversification, 3 when the firm belongs to the 3D1N profile have three years of diversification, and 4 when the firm is diversified 
over its first four years as a public company. Fifteen firms belong to the 4D profile (see Table 3.1). T-statistics are reported below the coefficients. Marginal 
effects measure the change in predicted probability for a unit change in the variable. 
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Table 3.23: Multinomial Logistic Regression with firm profitability (Ebit_Sale), growth opportunities (G_o) and peer pressure 
(PIND) as regressors for BG M sample 
 
(BG M) MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION – PROFITABILITY, GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PEER 
PRESSURE 
  
  Ln(1D3N/4N) Ln(2D2N/4N) Ln(3D1N/4N) Ln(4D/4N) 
 Coefficients ME Coefficients ME Coefficients ME Coefficients ME 
         
Age -0.367 <.0001 -0.616 -<.0001 -0.17 -0.047 0.042 0.014 
 0.112  0.328  0.201  0.488  
Cashflow -0.11 <.0001 -0.099 -<.0001 -0.107 -0.010 -0.165 -0.005 
 0.015  0.027  0.021  0.097  
Ebit_Sale 0.158 <.0001 0.185 -<.0001 0.172 -0.048 1.095 0.065 
 0.192  0.135  0.170  0.539  
NWC 0.029 <.0001 0.068 <.0001 -0.045 -0.011 -0.039 0.002 
 0.555  0.225  0.432  0.201  
Size 0.776 <.0001 0.412 -<.0001 0.569 0.126 0.765 0.004 
 0.095  0.393  0.205  0.061  
G_o 38.69 <.0001 40.452 <.0001 37.823 5.339 22.643 -1.375 
 0.078  0.066  0.084  0.221  
PIND -477 -0.001 -1312.5 -<.0001 -98.66 -15.239 -44.01 3.618 
  
  <.0001   <.0001   0.0002   0.027   
The dependent variable takes the values of 0 when the firm manifests 4N profile, 1 when the firm is 1D3N has one year of diversification, 2 when the 
firm is 2D2N has two years of diversification, 3 when the firm belongs to the 3D1N profile have three years of diversification, and 4 when the firm is diversified 
over its first four years as a public company. Fifteen firms belong to the 4D profile (see Table 3.1). T-statistics are reported below the coefficients. Marginal 
effects measure the change in predicted probability for a unit change in the variable.   
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Table 3.24: Multinomial Logistic Regression with ROA, growth opportunities (G_o) and peer pressure (PIND) as regressors for 
BG M sample 
 
(BG M) MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION – ROA, GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PEER PRESSURE 
  
  Ln(1D3N/4N) Ln(2D2N/4N) Ln(3D1N/4N) Ln(4D/4N) 
 Coefficients ME Coefficients ME Coefficients ME Coefficients ME 
         
Age -0.331 -<.0001 -0.635 -<.0001 -0.159 -0.049 0.053 0.025 
 0.105  0.351  0.238  0.379  
Cashflow -0.110 -<.0001 -0.096 -<.0001 -0.101 -0.013 -0.105 -0.0001 
 0.017  0.034  0.034  0.22  
ROA 0.073 <.0001 0.059 <.0001 0.039 0.006 -0.01 -0.005 
 0.248  0.349  0.392  0.824  
NWC 0.017 <.0001 0.071 <.0001 -0.061 -0.016 -0.042 0.005 
 0.827  0.389  0.401  0.132  
Size 0.519 <.0001 0.195 -<.0001 0.432 0.100 0.947 0.037 
 0.350  0.729  0.396  0.073  
G_o 34.02 <.0001 36.266 <.0001 33.643 5.519 22.106 -1.933 
 0.108  0.087  0.110  0.203  
PIND -496.7 -0.0004 -1367.7 <.0001 -96.3 -17.024 -43.13 6.304 
  <.0001   <.0001   0.0002   0.023   
The dependent variable takes the values of 0 when the firm manifests 4N profile, 1 when the firm is 1D3N has one year of diversification, 2 when the 
firm is 2D2N has two years of diversification, 3 when the firm belongs to the 3D1N profile have three years of diversification, and 4 when the firm is diversified 
over its first four years as a public company. Fifteen firms belong to the 4D profile (see Table 3.1). T-statistics are reported below the coefficients. Marginal 
effects measure the change in predicted probability for a unit change in the variable.   
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Figure 3.1: Timeline of BG enterprises that globally diversify beginning with their IPO year. 
 
 
I generate three samples based on their ongoing diversification progression. I name the samples BG (14), BG (25), and BG 
(36) as I move away from the inception date (year 1). An eventual sample labeled BG (47) was reviewed but there were not enough 
observations, subsequently my analysis concentrates on BG (14), BG (25) and BG (36) samples. 
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Figure 3.2: Timeline of BG enterprises that globally diversify beginning with their IPO 
year. 
 
This figure plots the number of global diversified firms in born global and born-again global samples 
from 1992 to 2009. Samples born global (BG 14), (BG 25) and (BG 36) consist of newly issued firms that 
report pre-tax foreign income starting with their IPO year, respectively, one and two consecutive years after 
their IPO and continue for three additional years. Sample born-again global (BaG) comprises mature firms 
reporting pre-tax foreign income for four consecutive years.
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